A Pacific Dragon? 21st Century Chinese Foreign Policy

By Jenny Lin

Abstract

With China poised to overtake the United States as the next superpower, the inter- national community is captivated by Chinese progress and concerned by its foreign policy. Policy decisions made by the politburo in the past few years reveal that the Chinese government has consistently focused on economic development and has thus oriented all policy measures to that end. In recent years, China has pursued cooperative relationships with many states and complied with various international protocols to ensure continued growth. Fundamentally, Chinese foreign policy can be categorized by four fundamental goals—establish a multipolar system; minimize the power contest; address national security concerns; and promote an image as a responsible pow- er—all aimed towards unobstructed Chinese economic growth and prosperity.

As an autocratic state, the People’s Republic of China reaches its foreign policy strategy through the decisions made and general framework set by its top leadership—the paramount leader and the core nucleus of a few government officials formally a part of the Chinese politburo standing committee. Currently, the politburo consists of nine government officials who determine the overall direction of Chinese foreign policy through recommendations by various specialized departments and offices (Kahn 2007). Although it may appear that China’s foreign policy is a combination of work by numerous government branches, in reality, the politburo sets the ultimate direction of Chinese policy which is eventually realized, adjusting for reality, by the “lower” offices. In order to fully represent the administrative support the politburo receives throughout the decision making process, this committee includes important government officials from branches like the military who are key in putting over- arching foreign policy ideas as deter- mined by the politburo into practice.

History

Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the bipolar inter- national structure, the People’s Republic of China has risen to prominence in the international system. While some continue to suspect Beijing of embarking on its own quest of imperialism in the developing world, the entirety of Chinese foreign policy can be summarized to be following one primary goal—the strengthening of Chinese economic power and consequently increasing China’s clout on the international stage (Suzuki 2009). “The rise and fall of great powers are based on economic power that grows within states at different rates”(Li 2004). In order to foster a favorable environment for China’s national goal of economic growth and rise to power, the Chinese government has pursued a foreign policy promoting multi- polarity as well as international and regional stability.

As the People’s Republic of China reaches its thirty-first year since initiating market reforms, the state continues on its quest for economic development and modernization (Scissors 2009). However, unlike Mao’s original emphasis on independence and autarchy, the Chinese leadership has realized that economic growth cannot be sustained in isolation from global politics and has therefore undertaken policy measures that further secure and stabilize the political environment for Chinese growth. The national economic goals have been maintained as the “over- riding consideration” throughout the state’s policies, as Deng had originally recommended (Zhang and Yao 2004).

Foreign Policy Goals

One of the main policy measures undertaken to ensure unobstructed economic growth and development has been a promotion of multipolarity in international politics—a system that would allow China more political influence and economic opportunity. During the Cold War, China enjoyed a unique position as the “swing” power between two duel- ing superpowers. Without significant investment in the national military, China was able to impact global politics at the level of a global power simply by aligning with either the United States or the Soviet Union (Zhao 2004). However, after the collapse of the USSR, the People’s Republic of China suffered from a political identity crisis. Without the bipolar power dynamic, Beijing’s role in global politics diminished significantly. Recently, China has started to re-assert itself in global affairs “by increasing its trade, peddling arms, attracting foreign aid and investment, and exporting construction workers” (Zhao 2004). As long as the world order progresses towards multipolarity, China would remain relatively free to build the perfect base from which to modernize while gaining greater economic and political power.

To further clear the path for its economic modernization, China has been actively working towards stabilizing its immediate surroundings and other areas of interest, like the oil supplier countries of the Middle East. While such policies directly secure Chinese economic pursuits by ensuring a safe and stable environment for Beijing’s operations, such international involvement also adds to the image of China as a responsible power—working within the realms of the United Nations to promote progress and world peace. Such beneficent behavior, however superficial, works to abate inter- national concern and suspicion of China as an aggressive revisionist state out to upset the status quo and replace liberal democratic ideals with the “Beijing model” of communism and autocracy (Suzuki 2009).

Multipolarity

In the pursuit of a hospitable environment for Chinese economic development, Beijing has worked diligently to construct a stable and multipolar world. Especially after the experiences of the Tiananmen incident, China has come to realize the constraints of active and powerful American-led interference. China has since strongly advocated for “the development of constructive relations of mutual trust and cooperation” with a number of nations. Following Deng’s principles of independence and self-reliance in regards to nation- al and foreign policy, China has been able to establish partnerships with the world’s major powers without forming a binding political alliance (Cheng and Zhang 2004). Examples include a cooperative partnership with Russia established in 1996, and comprehensive partnerships established with France, Canada, and Mexico the following year (Cheng and Zhang 2004). This insistence on non-alignment has given Beijing a high degree of diplomatic flexibility. Relations with one state can be pursued without affecting China’s relationship with another. Such a configuration allows China access to various sources of trade and technological exchange—diversifying in case of future opposition from one nation and further aiding in the nation’s modernization. This resulting system of international relationships also sets a precedent for a future co- operative multipolar world order.

Specifically, Chinese elites foresee a future power configuration with China and the European Union as two of the major poles. China and the EU share a concern over American aggression and possible hegemony, as well as issues concerning nuclear proliferation and international organized crime, like human trafficking. Beijing is supportive of the consolidation of the European Union and seeks to preserve the valuable partnership (Bezlova 2009). Over the last decade, there have been eleven China-EU summits as a part of the comprehensive strategic partnership to address a variety of international issues and policy concerns. During the 2007 summit, both sides appeared to agree on the importance of economic co- operation, and the European Union has offered diplomatic support of the PRC’s One-China policies (Faiola and Goldfarb 2008). Unfortunately, European apprehension regarding China’s human rights record has resurfaced following the Tibetan uprising. However, considering the current condition of the world economy, the European Union cannot be too demanding of one of the fastest growing economies in the world— the 11th summit finally took place in Prague after its initial cancellation over the Dalai Lama’s visit to France. Even though China and the EU have reached a tentative understanding based on mutual economic goals, China’s greater economic clout may not be as effective as the EU grows and consolidates.

Minimize Power Contest

A similar problem is present in the bilateral relationship between China and the United States—although the US is the uncontested superpower, China’s economic prosperity grants it a certain degree of leverage. In September of 2008, China officially surpassed Japan in becoming the owner of the largest portion of the US debt; the American trade deficit with China amounted to an aston- ishing $268,040 million in the same year (Morrison and Labonte 2008). In order to keep the Chinese Yuan undervalued against the dollar—sus- taining high export levels of Chinese goods—the Bank of China has been purchasing large amounts of US dollars. Rather than simply hold on to American currency, the Chinese central bank has converted them into US securities as an investment strategy (Barroso and Socrates 2007). Along with over $585 billion of US Treasury securities, China has es- sentially purchased the ability to alter the monetary policy of the United States (Bezlova 2009). Although the Chinese leadership have consistently restated the intention to maintain the status quo, possible worst case sce- narios continue to haunt the Ameri- can government. If the Chinese cen- tral bank decided to suddenly unload a large portion of its bond holdings, a cascade of consequences would follow leading to an eventual collapse of the American economy.

Logically, the Chinese leadership would hesitate to pursue such a policy because a defunct American economy would mean a much smaller market for Chinese goods and a slowing of export-lead growth. However, the possibility remains and the American government will only become more anxious as the PRC gains greater political power (Faiola and Goldfarb 2008). Unfortunately, the US economic model is structured to remain heavily reliant on foreign investment and credit—until that changes, the Sino-American relation- ship will be a tenuous one. The US may look to extend its power in other forums to check growing Chinese power.

Considering such complications in the forum of international powers, China has chosen to a pursue a path under the radar and relocated its focus onto its immediate environment—striving for regional power status as opposed to that of an international superpower. For the first time in years, China has a clearly formulated periphery policy. China has reached out to India to mitigate security concerns regard- ing the shared border area, as well as to countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the same month to address economic cooperation measures. Formal agreements aside, China has also assumed the posturing of a regional leader as seen in the way Chinese elites responded to the Asian financial crisis during the summer of 1997. Beijing’s “stand-by-Asia” policy garnered it acceptance and influence in South- east Asia along with improved relations, especially economic ones, with nations in the area (Morrison and Labonte 2008). The Chinese leadership has even pursued a level of friendship with Taiwan. Unfortunately, despite progress in the realms of finance, air travel, and cross-strait crime, peace and stability will not be possible or permanent until the island of Taiwan is officially declared as a part of the People’s Republic of China. As much as the Chinese leadership is content with the economic benefits and the current progression of events, Chinese cultural history and current popular sentiments say otherwise. As one Chinese scholar so eloquently put it, “the day when Taiwan declares independence will be the day war begins” (Zhao 2004). A part of the Chinese Communist Party’s revitalization of nationalism is the current fervor and popular de- mand for the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. However, the Chinese leadership has been able to downplay cross-strait concerns in light of other, more pressing issues.

Security Concerns

Towards the north, China has fostered the spirit of cooperation with the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security focused arrangement, in 2001 with some countries of the former Soviet Union including Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as well as the Russian Federation (Brown 2009). While the Shanghai Pact addresses select concerns, Beijing has also been in pursuit of a more evolved partner- ship with Moscow to secure economic and security interests. Not only is Russia one of the main suppliers of energy for the ever-growing Chinese industries but it also shares an extensive border with China posing a possible threat to China’s national security.

Even though the strategic triangle arrangement of the Cold War is no longer in use, a ghost of the old relationship remains alive today. Efforts have been in place since the early 1990s to coordinate both trade and security arrangements between the two powers. Although the two countries regard each other with wariness, both governments acknowledge the importance of this partner- ship. While a friendly Russia ensures China’s energy supply and security along its northern border, a cooperative China is the biggest customer of the Russian military industrial complex. As the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations comes to pass, leaders from both nations are busy coordinating responses to the current financial disaster, and the respective militaries are contemplating a possible joint exercise (Liu 2004). As the oil pipeline from Skovorodino to northeast China is finally being constructed—15 years after its proposal—China has yet an- other source of petroleum to fuel its growing industrial complex and, as President Medvedev said, “minimize negative effects of the world crisis on [both] economies” (Zhao 2004). In analyzing this particular development with the Russian Federation, it is important to note the lack of appeal to a common ideological tradition of either nation (Zhao 2004). Contrary to Western sentiment, the partnership is established predominantly in pursuit of mutual economic interests rather than the beginning of a communist world order seeking to supplant the current ideals of liberal democracy.

Image as a Responsible Power

Outside of the immediate region, Beijing has recently pursued a more mainline, popular approach in deal- ing with the third world. As exemplified by its involvement in Africa as a part of UN aid forces, China is very keen on cultivating its image as a responsible global power. Chinese foreign policy makers like to emphasize China’s fundamental beliefs in “multilateralism, peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit, and common development” (Dittmer 2004). Although China’s commitments in countries in the Middle East and Africa are logical from an economic standpoint—countries like Sudan and Saudi Arabia are some of the biggest supplies of petroleum to the PRC—Beijing is also involved in UN efforts in countries like Cote d’Ivoire from which China receives no apparent benefit. Some observers have labeled such altruism as the Chinese attempt to extend its sphere of influence in countries that have yet to adopt the Western model. However, a large number of these peacekeeping operations have had the explicit purpose to establish liberal democracies in unstable nations modeled after Western states (Suzuki 2009). Even in countries where Chinese economic interests do exist, Beijing has implemented policies consistent with that of the international community— like pressuring Sudan to respect basic human rights conventions despite the possible damage on the petroleum trade relationship between the two states. While such seemingly worth- less acts of kindness may actually result in the “excessive responsibilities” that Beijing has been worried about since joining international organizations, it ultimately adds to the image of the PRC as undergo- ing a “peaceful rise” that other states need not be wary of (Zhao 2008). It is simply a way for the People’s Re- public of China to demonstrate that it is capable of undertaking the great power responsibilities of promoting international stability and development (Suzuki 2009).

A similar theme of a “responsible” and “peaceful” rise to power can be seen in the Chinese administration of Hong Kong since its return to the PRC in 1997. Instead of strictly implementing the rule of the Chinese Communist Party as some feared, the Chinese leadership actually chose to implement the “one country, two systems” approach in order to maintain the foreign investments flowing into the mainland from Hong Kong (Li 2004). Although leaving Western capitalism in full functioning force may pose security challenges to the PRC, the foreign investment in the area is crucial to China’s modernization process which is, after all, the overriding national interest regard- less of the circumstances. The establishment of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region further demonstrates the commitment to national economic development of Beijing, even at the expense of national security.

Undeniably, it is within China’s best interest to continue its course of economic development and rise to power. However, in order to achieve future power status, the People’s Republic of China must pay great attention to the balance between its various foreign policy interests. First and foremost, Chinese economic interests must be considered regardless of the political agenda.

As the People’s Republic of China pursues its quest for economic success and influence, its policy of focusing on the economy while adopt- ing a non-threatening appearance should last well into the 21st century. However, despite Beijing’s attempts at ensuring a peaceful rise to power, the future of China will not be as unobstructed as the leadership would like. China has not been spared its share of damages and set-backs with the current economic conditions. In the near future, the Chinese leader- ship may also have to make a deci- sion between petroleum and human rights in places like the Middle East and Africa, finally settle the Taiwan situation, and strategically deal with the trade balance contention with the US. Considering the recent internal issues brought about by unrest in Xinjiang, the Chinese government will also need to discover a domes- tic policy framework that will both maintain national stability and appease international human rights concerns. While the numerous partnerships with other major powers should ameliorate the situation, any US- or EU- led Western opposition in the international forum could pose a formidable challenge. Within the context of China’s thousand-year political history, this is merely the transitional phase before China secures its spot as one of the influential poles in the international political system.

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