A STUDY ON APOLOGY: NO GUN RI

By Sharon Wu

Abstract

In 1950, U.S. troops fighting the Korean War committed a gruesome war crime against 400 South Korean civilians. The residents of No Gun Ri, a small town in South Korea, were accused of housing Communist infiltrators and were thus forced to evacuate their town. The U.S. soldiers then fired on the unsuspecting civilians without permission or evidence. The case has been covered up by American military intelligence, but the families of the victims have brought the case to light and now demand an official apology from the U.S. government. This paper explores the intricacies of official state apologies and how they relate to this particular crime at No Gun Ri.

In July of 1950, about 400 innocent South Korean civilians were brutally massacred by U.S. soldiers suspicious of North Korean spies. Ten years after the massacre, No Gun Ri survivors began requesting a formal apology from the United States government. They have yet to receive one. While the U.S. soldiers were clearly guilty of a horrendous war crime, a formal national apology has not been issued because diplomatic apologies are complicated, expensive, and very political. Yet, they are necessary to human rights, especially when a gross human rights violation has occurred. However, national apologies issued to war victims may temporarily and monetarily alleviate the pain of war crimes, but no verbal apology or monetary compensation will ever entirely erase the physical and emotional scars of war. Therefore, a formal national apology is primarily a symbolic gesture that establishes historical truths, progresses human rights, and strengthens relationships between nations and people.  The victims of No Gun Ri are seeking apology in an attempt to accomplish all these things.

Theories on Apology

Norma Field, an East Asian studies professor at the University of Chicago, thoroughly discusses the concept of apology from a theoretical and practical perspective in her article “War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After.” She stipulates that all sincere apologies – between close friends or between competing nations – express regret in hopes of “cancel[ing] the offense.”[1] Sometimes, an apology is issued with some form of physical compensation, be it flowers or chocolate or monetary reimbursement. A genuine apology should also cost the offender in some way, “either in the currency of pride,”[2] or in currency of money. However, the worse the offense, the more difficult it is to convey a heartfelt apology that sufficiently eases the pain. When it comes to national apologies, this is often the case. Their crimes are often so atrocious that any apology – verbal, monetary, or otherwise – is inadequate for all offended parties.

For a nation-state apologizing to a group of people or another nation-state, an authentic and political apology includes three crucial elements: “recognition of the facts, verbal apology, and payment of compensation.”[3] The authenticity and effectiveness of an apology is often measured in the “realization of material [political and economic] gain.”[4]

There are a number of difficulties naturally associated with national apologies. For one, generational gaps and gender or ethnic differences complicate the terms of apology.[5] When a nation seeks to apologize to a group of people divided by such differences, it is less likely to satisfy all these different groups. Different age groups, gender groups, and ethnic groups have different moral values, forms of communication, cultural environments, and lingual habits. They are likely to interpret apologies in different ways and disagree on the sincerity of the apology. Therefore, they are more likely to be unsatisfied with the apology.

The issue of “material restitution”[6] as a part of a national apology is also a controversial matter. If a nation issues monetary compensation to the victims of offense, it gives something of value in an attempt to convey authenticity in its apology.  While some consider this to be a concerted attempt at apology, others view it as condescending and insulting. Critics of material restitution as apology believe that currency places monetary value on the lives of victims and degrades victims as “explicitly subject to calculations of value.”[7] Still others figure that, although material restitution may be degrading, simple words will never be enough. Therefore, some economic gain may as well be reaped.

Historical Examples of Apology

There are a number of historical instances that show that national apologies are an effective means of diminishing grief and improving human relations. There are also other public apologies that have been ineffective and even counterproductive. National apologies can evoke any number of reactions, both positive and negative.

Norma Field cites the instance of Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro’s dramatic apology to Asian victims of Japanese violence during World War II. After his apology, three specific positive developments for the people of Japan occurred. One, the Japanese government’s apology acknowledged the historical truths of World War II that are relevant to Japanese history and world history. Two, “the conditions of Japanese citizenship”[8] were fundamentally altered, and Japanese citizens earned greater respect for apologizing to other Asian nations. Three, there was a possibility for the beginnings of a “new Japan”[9] emerging from the rubble of a devastating war. All three developments signified a strong step forward for Japan’s government and citizens, thus demonstrating a potential positive outcome after a national apology. In this example, the outcome benefited both the war-torn people of Japan and the victims of Japanese war crimes.

Conversely, not all apology efforts are received graciously, and some are futile and even detrimental. In 1998, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan traveled to Rwanda to speak in front of the Rwandan parliament. He planned on apologizing for the U.N.’s failure to intervene on behalf of the victims of the Rwandan genocide in hopes of strengthening the relationship between the U.N. and Rwanda. Historians, the Rwandan government, and the Rwandan people consider this apology to be a massive failure because of Annan’s “nondiscussion of his personal culpability for U.N. action, his democratization of blame for the genocide, and the appearance of personal arrogance created by his language choices.”[10] Annan’s rhetorical choices and personal demeanor worked against him. While he made an honest attempt at forging a closer bond with Rwanda, his apology essentially failed.

Media analysis and behavioral analysis show that the citizens of Rwanda were not satisfied with Annan’s apology. The Rwandan president, vice president, and prime minister failed to show up at a reception for Annan that followed the Secretary General’s speech.[11] During a formal meeting between Annan and several Rwandan genocide survivors, citizens interrogated him about his lack of intervention and openly criticized his speech.[12] While Annan had warm intentions, his apology failed to address her personal failures on behalf of genocide survivors, leaving scarred victims even more upset. His apology – or lack thereof – demonstrates the symbolic power of formal apologies. His failed speech shows just how deeply a formal apology can affect those who seek one.

South Korean victims of the American crime committed at No Gun Ri compose just one group of people seeking a formal apology from the U.S. government. Their continual plea for a state-issued apology reveals the symbolic strength of a genuine apology. However, the case with No Gun Ri victims demonstrates that a delivering an apology is no simple act. A formal public apology is a complex matter involving historical accuracy, foreign policy, diplomatic relations, and national credibility. 

The Incident at No Gun Ri

During the Korean War, hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers were sent to South Korea to defend the democratic government from North Korea’s Communist attacks. Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, approximately 380,000 South Korean citizens began fleeing further south in order to escape the advancing North Korean army.[13] These refugees included mostly women, children, and the elderly, since the young men had been drafted into the South Korean army. The U.S. army became increasingly concerned with North Korean Communist infiltrators in these groups of unorganized refugees.

On July 25th, 1950, U.S. soldiers evacuated a small South Korean village and forced the inhabitants south towards the town of No Gun Ri, a village in the North Chungcheong province. U.S. soldiers suspected North Korean spies within this group of South Korean civilians, so they searched the villagers for suspicious items but found none. Yet, the U.S. soldiers still suspected North Korean spies within the group, despite a complete lack of evidence. With no apparent proof of espionage, the U.S. soldiers ordered an air raid that killed about one hundred of these villagers. The remaining villagers were forced into a tunnel nearby. The American soldiers then proceeded to fire into both ends of the tunnel, killing an additional three hundred people. The refugees were trapped in the tunnel for several days and no cease-fire orders were issued.[14]

Years after the massacre at No Gun Ri, the victims remained silent about the crime. It wasn’t until 1960, that survivors began to petition for an official government investigation, a formal U.S. apology, and monetary compensation.[15] Initially, the U.S. government made no efforts to investigate the claims and denied any responsibility for their actions. However, in 1999, the Associated Press published Charles Hanley’s investigative report on the massacre at No Gun Ri, bringing the story to international attention. Following the publication of Hanley’s piece, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen ordered a committee to investigate the incident. After eleven years of research, the Department of Defense released the No Gun Ri Review, a 300 page report that confirmed the massacre’s occurrence and the fault of the U.S. soldiers.[16] However, the No Gun Ri Review left out and ignored critical information and documents regarding the attack on the South Korean civilians. The No Gun Ri Report failed to address all the faults of the U.S. military institution in regards to this historic event.

Even after the release of the No Gun Ri Review and hundreds of American and Korean witness testimonies, President William Clinton would not issue a formal apology to the South Korean victims. He stated that “the evidence was not clear that there was responsibility for wrongdoing high enough in the chain of command in the Army to say that, in effect the government was responsible.”[17] Clinton did issue a statement of regret in which he announced that the U.S. would fund the building of a memorial and the establishment of a scholarship fund.[18] However, it was not a formal apology and, according to scholars, “expressing regret about a past deed is seldom viewed as equivalent to an apology.”[19] This is primarily because regret does not include “the recognition that one has been wrong,”[20] which is a key component to a real apology. Since Clinton’s statement of regret, No Gun Ri survivors and South Korean human rights groups have continuously petitioned for a real apology.

Why South Koreans Want an Apology

By long custom and international law, targeting noncombatants is a war crime.”[21] Charles Hanley’s simple statement expresses the gross abuse of human rights that occurred at No Gun Ri. The U.S. soldiers that ordered the air raid and fired upon the innocent South Korean civilians clearly violated international criminal law and basic right to life. In addition to the hundreds of deaths inflicted that day, many more survived but suffered from permanent physical damage. Naturally, all survivors were emotionally scarred by the bloodshed of the massacre. These victims certainly have the right to an apology in hopes of gaining symbolic dignity and emotional closure.

In one of many letters sent from victims to President Bill Clinton, Eunyong Chung requests “a formal apology and compensation”[22] for the incident at No Gun Ri. No where in this letter does Chung state that an apology would alleviate the pain of memory. Instead, he states that he and his fellow citizens want “the truth, justice and due respect for our basic human rights”[23] because that is all that can be satisfied with a sincere apology. To further prove this, Chung says:

We are still suffering from the vivid memory of this unforgetable [sic] day. Some survivors live with permanently disfigured bodies (without one eye or nose and so on). Others are in sorrow because they live without thier [sic] families. About 400 souls roam around high above the killingfield [sic].[24]

In these sentences, Chung acknowledges the permanence of the war crimes committed. No apology or monetary compensation can recover the losses or erase the memories. A formal apology would serve as a symbolic acknowledgement of wrongdoing and regret.  An apology would also address historical human rights issues and international legal customs that are essential to a democratic society.

Why the United States Won’t Issue an ApologyDuring the Cold War era, the United States defined itself as “the defender of freedom and human rights.”[25] Thousands of American troops fought on foreign territory, all in an effort to prevent the spread of communism and to support the principles and practice of democracy. A U.S. apology during or after the Cold War would challenge its position as a global leader.[26] An apology would acknowledge an undemocratic error that thoroughly undermines traditional American values of life and liberty. The U.S. government would be forced to admit that it does not always uphold and practice its own visions of justice. This admission could potentially open doors for other war crimes victims seeking formal apologies. All these admissions would challenge the American military’s respectability. 

Although President Clinton expressed “regret,” offered his “condolences,” and agreed to erect a memorial and fund a scholarship to commemorate the tragic incident at No Gun Ri, he denied a formal apology to the victims of No Gun Ri.[27] In his statement, he said,

As we honor those civilians who fell victim to this conflict, let us not forget that pain is not the only legacy of the Korean War. American and Korean veterans fought shoulder to shoulder in the harshest conditions for the cause of freedom, and they prevailed. The vibrancy of democracy in the Republic of Korea, the strong alliance between our two countries, and the closeness of our two peoples today is a testament to the sacrifices made by both of our nations fifty years ago.[28]

This statement clearly establishes the United States’ position of power. Although he acknowledges the unfortunate events that happened at No Gun Ri, Clinton justified America’s military presence in South Korea for the purpose of freedom and democracy. While he regretted the incident at No Gun Ri, he still supported military intervention in Korea because it allowed the U.S. to maintain its position as a global military leader. By admitting fault to war crimes, the U.S. would be questioning the legality of its past military intervention in Korea. In doing so, the United States could lose diplomatic and military credibility.

Additionally, if the U.S. did issue a formal apology to the No Gun Ri victims, other war crimes victims and human rights groups would be encouraged to press their demands for apology. If the U.S. admitted to one military mistake, it would be subjected to admitting many more. An unending list of apologies could possibly take away the sincerity of an apology, thus discrediting all apologies.

Why the South Korean Government May Not Want an ApologyWhile it is natural for the victims of No Gun Ri to demand a U.S. apology, evidence shows that the government administration of South Korea may be more hesitant to receive a formal apology for American war crimes in Korea.

South Korea remains economically, politically, and militarily dependent on the United States. In 1954, the United States and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, which guaranteed that both countries would protect the other if attacked. Because of this treaty, the U.S. government keeps approximately 37,000 troops in South Korea for protection.[29] The United States is South Korea’s most important trading partner, and only in recent years has China overtaken the U.S. as South Korea’s largest export market.[30] The U.S. provides important political and economic resources that protect South Korean interests, and the South Korean government obviously cherishes that alliance.  If the U.S. issued an apology to the South Korean civilians for the massacre at No Gun Ri, it would be admitting to a humiliating war crime. An apology would be a South Korean victory at the expense of the U.S. A U.S. defeat could sour the diplomatic relationship between the two nations. Because South Korea is far more dependent on the U.S. than on any other nation, South Korea could potentially suffer.

Because the South Korean government does not necessarily want an apology, it has attempted to impose collective amnesia upon its citizens in hopes of progressing its relationship with the United States.[31] Following the Korean War, South Korea wanted to strengthen its relations with the U.S. It did so by helping the U.S. maintain its global leadership role. After the Korean War armistice, the South Korean government focused heavily on publicizing anti-Communist rhetoric and glossed over the American crimes committed on Korean soil, including the occurrence at No Gun Ri. Media outlets and news sources purposely overlooked and underreported many of the American war crimes.[32] The South Korean government purposely disregarded American responsibility, all in hopes of preserving strong ties with the U.S. government and economy.

Conclusion

While the historical evidence and hundreds of witness testimonies prove that the U.S. did indeed violate international law and human rights at No Gun Ri, a formal apology would certainly have multiple consequences that could be both beneficial and detrimental. Historical examples show that apologies can have positive and negative effects, or can be entirely useless. However, for the victims of any human rights violation, a formal apology would still serve mostly as a symbolic gesture that could provide some element of closure. Apologies are primarily symbolic – sometimes economic when monetary compensation is paid – and provide a significant ending to the darker memories in a country’s history. The best of apologies have the ability to officially conclude these nightmarish chapters in history and give way to a brighter future for people hurt by violence. The best of apologies establish historical facts, open up new historical debates, bring together people with a history of conflict, and set standards for human rights. For the survivors of the No Gun Ri massacre, a U.S. apology would ideally do the same.

WORKS CITED

Clinton, William J. 2001. Statement on the Korean War incident at No Gun Ri. Washington, D.C.: Presidential Papers, Administration of William J. Clinton. 11 January. Available on-line at clinton6.nara.gov/2001/01/2001-01-11-statement-by-the-president-on-no-gun-ri.html (accessed 4 May 2011).
Edwards, Jason A. “The Mission of Healing: Kofi Annan’s Failed Apology.” Atlantic Journal of Communication 16, no. 2 (2008): 88-104.
Field, Norma. “War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After.” Positions 5, no. 1 (1997): 1-51.
Hanley, Charles J. “No Gun Ri: Official Narrative and Inconvenient Truths.” Critical Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (2010): 589-622.
Hanley, Charles J., Sang-Hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza. The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare From the Korean War. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001.
Manyin, Mark. South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects. CRS Report for Congress (2004).
Suh, Jae-Jung. “Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea.” Critical Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (2010): 503-524.
Weyeneth, Robert R. “The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical Reconciliation.” The Public Historian 23, no. 3 (2001): 9-38.