China’s Ultimate Grand Strategy: Benevolent Leadership in the Asia Pacific?

Source: Reuters

---

China as a Global Leader
 
America isn’t the only country with its eyes on Southeast Asia. Just as the US has its own Pivot -- later renamed Rebalance -- to Asia, so too does China. In a 2012 speech, Xi Jinping outlined his own vision for the region as “a community of common destiny.” Since then, China has unveiled two new programs, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt, One Road initiative. Both seek to develop the Asia Pacific and create more economic partnerships for China. Through these words and actions, China has created a narrative of benign global leadership, painting itself as the leader of the developing world. However, while it has certainly captured the hard power aspects of global leadership, it has neglected some of the softer aspects -- that is, its diplomatic efforts.
 
That begs the question -- does China want to be seen as a benevolent leader? It seems that this is the case. Wang Jisi in his Foreign Affairs article “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy” argues that diplomacy since Hu’s presidency has become less inward-thinking and country-oriented, and more multilateral and “issue-oriented.” Jisi concludes that this counters Deng Xiaoping’s old school of thought, tao guang yang hui, or, keeping a low profile in international affairs.[1]
 
But there is a difference between being merely a more active power and a responsible power. The former China certainly has become, but the latter is less clear. The recent Rohingya Crisis presents a good opportunity for China to clarify its goals in the region. While it has currently played a very minimal role in the crisis, it is not too late for China to take a more active role and show that it is able to lead more than just through economics.
 
Meanwhile, in the Andaman...
 
Over the last month, international media has echoed the plight of refugees in the Mediterranean. Images show crowded camps, “boat-people” begging to be rescued, barbed-wired fences, hundreds of thousands of Syrians fleeing chaos back home. Yet, the media seems to have forgotten that on the other side of the world thousands of Rohingya refugees remain at sea, with one hundred thousand more in resettlement camps.
 
A Crisis In the Making
 
The Rohingya are a Muslim minority in Burma, neither recognized as Burmese citizens nor included in the national census. Over one million Rohingya live in the Rakhine state bordering Bangladesh. Burma does not refer to these people as Rohingya, but rather as "Bengalis.” In reality, the Rohingya have lived in Burma for generations.[2] Burma's Buddhist majority, especially under the new government, has severely persecuted the Rohingya. Buddhist mobs, for example, have killed 280 Rohingya, and tens of thousands more have been driven from their homes to camps where they are denied the right to work, receive adequate education, or access healthcare.[3]
 
Disaster at Sea
 
Over 120,000 Rohingya in total have fled Burma in the past three years. Most of this was done through human traffickers who smuggled the Rohingya across the Burmese-Thai and Malaysian borders. With Thailand's crackdown of land-based human trafficking, Rohingya smuggling has shifted to sea routes. Earlier this year, thousands of Rohingya took to shoddy boats to flee Burma, only to be left out at sea with little food or water. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 3,500 arrived to Malaysia and Indonesia already, while 2,500 still remain at sea.[4]
 
China and Humanitarianism
 
By the time the last Chinese dynasty fell a hundred years ago, the country had become decidedly anti-interventionist. It makes sense why: imperialists challenged sinocentrism, forced China to sign unequal treaties, converted Chinese people to Western religions, and utterly humiliated them.  Thus, when Mao took power, one of his major tenets was preventing Westerners from ever intervening in China’s matters again. 
 
However, non-intervention has not equated to anti-humanitarianism for China. As Hanna Krebs writes, “Humanitarianism is deeply engrained in China’s history.”[5] This dates back to Confucianism, with its dynastic cycles and Five Relationships. Legitimacy derived from following one’s roles. The emperor, at the top of the societal hierarchy, derived his legitimacy, the Mandate of Heaven, from protecting his people in times of disaster. Krebs concludes that humanitarianism through the lens of Chinese Confucianism is shaped by responsibility and state legitimacy.[6]
 
China has in fact played an active humanitarian role in recent years, though almost solely for natural disasters. For example, it quickly sent aid to Nepal after its 2015 earthquake, and also contributed relief to Asian Pacific nations after the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami. In response to the Ebola outbreak last year, it contributed $US 123 million to African Nations, the World Food Programme, and the World Health Organization.[7]
 
Notably, China has also provided aid in the form of infrastructure, loans, and grants, not only to the Asia Pacific, but to various African and South American countries as well. In comparison to other BRIC nations’ humanitarian expenditures, China tops the list. However, its humanitarian contributions total a measly US $4 million, or 0.03% of its GNI.[8] It should be mentioned, though, that China contributes the most of any permanent member of the Security Council to the United Nations peacekeeping forces, with over 2800 troops.[9]
 
Changing Times, Changing Norms
 
Given China’s own anti-interventionist stance in regards to its domestic affairs, its lack of involvement in Myanmar isn’t surprising. However, China should not be quickly written off as absolutely opposed to intervening when necessary. China’s actions in regards to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine shed some light on China’s norms. The R2P was recognized as a global norm at the 2005 UN World Summit and states the following:
 
1. The State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
 
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist States in fulfilling this responsibility.
 
3. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails to protect its populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective use of force through the UN Security Council.[10]
 
Although China has voiced its concerns about R2P and has vetoed various resolutions that mention this norm, including one in 2007 to intervene in Burma, China hasn’t always opposed intervention. For example, China did not veto intervention in Libya or South Sudan. While one could argue that these choices were merely based on economical and political concerns, they suggest that China doesn’t necessarily oppose the concept of R2P.
 
China’s perception of R2P is more specifically illustrated by its own modification of the doctrine, titled “Responsible Protection”, which , first articulated by the China Institute of International Studies in 2013, calls for more accountability and supervision mechanisms. Specifically, it recommends the following six principles:[11]

1. Object of intervention must clearly be to protect the people of the target country
2. The legitimacy of the ‘protection executors’ must be established
3. The means of protection must be strictly limited
4. Purpose of protection must be clearly defined; the patient must not be ‘killed’ as a result of intervention
5. Protectors must be responsible for post intervention reconstruction
6. The UN should establish mechanisms for supervision, outcome evaluation and post-factum accountability.

 
As Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee articulates in Responsibility to Protect: China’s Version, China may agree about the “responsibility for protecting civilians in internal conflicts”, but it disagrees with just how this protection will be implemented.[12] In other words, China supports pillars 1 and 2 of the R2P, but has reservations about the third pillar.
 
Interestingly, China has explicitly framed its “Responsible Protection” doctrine as a contribution of “its public goods to the international community.”[13] This illustrates China’s desire to play a role in norm building regarding intervention. What is often neglected in the Western media is that China’s R2P norm focuses more on prevention and post-conflict state building, and less on military intervention. 
 
Moving Forward
 
Humanitarianism isn’t distinctly Western, and China isn’t distinctly against involvement. Though China has serious reservations concerning R2P and humanitarian interventions, it also values legitimacy and respect and understand that these things are derived not only from economic growth but also from normative power and humanitarian leadership.
 
So, where does that leave China and the Rohingya crisis? Given China’s close ties with Burma and its history of vetoing UNSC resolutions concerning that nation, it’s unlikely China will take political action here. At the same time, though, China is looking to framing itself as a leader in the Asia Pacific. If ASEAN called upon China for support and provided China with a framework for implementation and assessment, China may make a move. Burma’s status as China’s quasi-client state complicates the matter, but it also gives China a unique amount of influence if it chooses to act. Also, if Western powers presented a Security Council resolution that was less about regime-change and intervention and more about protecting people, China may support it (or, more likely, abstain rather than veto).
 
What China should do in the meantime is provide aid to the UNHCR, the International Red Cross, and other international organizations. That way, China can avoid alienating Burma while also participating in humanitarianism in the region.  Such actions would reflect China’s new diplomatic strategy of an issue-oriented and multilateral focus. More importantly, by doing this, China would reinforce its narrative of benevolent leadership in the Asia Pacific -- its ultimate grand strategy.
 

References

[1] Ibid.

[2] Associated Press. “Rohingya Crisis Highlights Toothless Nature of ASEAN.” The New York Times. The
New York Times Company, 26 May 2015. Web. 27 May 2015.

[3] “Myanmar Picks Up Migrants As ASEAN Agrees to Tackle Crisis.” BBC News. British Broadcasting
Company, 29 May 2015. Web. 30 May 2015.

[4] “UN and Myanmar Spar Over Rohingya at Migrant Talks.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera Media Network, 29 May
2015. Web. 2 June 2015.

[5] Krebs, Hanna. "The 'Chinese Way'? The Evolution of Chinese Humanitarianism." Humanitarian Policy Group, September 1, 2014.

[6] Ibid.

[7] "China's Humanitarian Aid." United Nations Development Programme China, May 1, 2015.

[8] "China." Global Humanitarian Assistance. 2013. Accessed September 18, 2015.

[9] "Troop and Police Contributors. United Nations Peacekeeping." UN News Center. August 30, 2015. Accessed September 20, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.

[10] "An Introduction to the Responsibility to Protect." International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. Accessed September 12, 2015. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/learn-about-rtop.

[11] Banerjee, Dipankar. "‘Responsible Protection’: China’s Version of Responsibility to Protect." Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies. November 14, 2013. Accessed September 22, 2015. http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/responsibility-to-protect-chinas-version-4176.html.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Stuenkel, Oliver. "Responsible Protection: Chinese Norm Entrepreneurship?" Responsible Protection: Chinese Norm Entrepreneurship? January 24, 2015. Accessed September 17, 2015. http://www.postwesternworld.com/2015/01/24/responsible-protection-entrepreneurship/.

Alexander Melnik is a sophomore at the University of Southern California.