CAN WANG JINGWEI'S DECISION TO COLLABORATE WITH THE JAPANESE DURING WARTIME BE JUSTIFIED? 

By George Lowe

Abstract

After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese established the Reorganized National Government of China, a puppet state in central China, centered in Nanjing. It was headed by senior Kuomintang cadre, Wang Jingwei. He claimed to do so to protect the people under Japanese occupation and safeguard China as a whole, as he believed that a ‘War of Resistance’ would be disastrous to the nation. The author examines the complexities of Wang’s role, taking into consideration the historical background and various factors in his argument.

Beginning with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7 1937, China embarked on what became known as the War of Resistance, an eight year long struggle for its very survival. Having already set up the puppet state of Manchukuo in erstwhile Chinese territory, the Japanese continued to implement the so-called bunji gassaku (Boyle) program of fragmenting China into many weak, ostensibly autonomous states, all essentially under Japanese control and influence. One part of this strategy was the establishment of the Reorganised National Government of China, a puppet state for central China, centred on Nanjing. It was initially headed by Liang Hongzhi, a pro-Japanese minister. After his defection from Chiang Kai-Shek’s Chongqing government, the Japanese were delighted to receive Wang Jingwei as head in March 1940. Wang had been head of the Executive Yuan under Chiang and a prominent follower of Sun Yat-sen, which lending him a great deal of prestige in the eyes of nationalists and the general Chinese population. Thus his defection and collaboration seems all the more surprising. However, his actions seem more understandable given his belief that China would ruin itself by continuing to fight a superior enemy and his desire to protect the Chinese people in occupied areas from further depredation under Japanese rule. Wang also pointed to Pan-Asianism in order to justify his collaboration, buying into Japanese slogans concerning the “Creation of a New Order in East Asia” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence), which seems less genuine and justifiable, considering the overt intentions of Japanese militarists at the time. In the process of collaboration however, Wang “relinquished to Japan a vast measure of sovereignty” (Boyle) which in some eyes may seem indefensible and unjustifiable.

Throughout the course of Wang’s regime, he had to justify to the Chinese living under his Reorganized National Government the reasons for collaboration. In order to show that he was staying true to the nationalist principles which had won him such prestige (not to mention high office) in the 1930s, Wang often pointed to the concept of “Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Pan Asianism” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence). In a radio address of June 1941, Wang criticised the nationalists for not staying true to Sun’s legacy and having “failed to make united efforts for the attainment of that ideal [Pan-Asianism]” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence). Wang was effectively buying into the Japanese idea of a ‘New Order’ in East Asia by collaborating and associating his prestige with it. However, “he could not conceal the fact that the Japan of 1940 was not the Japan that had befriended Sun and assisted the Nationalist cause in the early years of the century” (Boyle). Sun himself had become suspicious of Japanese progress and in his final address to a Japanese audience warned them of the dangers of becoming too Western in essence, and not retaining a sense of Asian fraternity (Spence). By the time Wang collaborated, and identified throughout the 1930s with increasingly aggressive Japanese policies, the Japanese had developed a more hierarchical and less fraternal vision of ‘Pan Asianism’. By late 1938, after Wang’s defection from the Chongqing government, Chiang was ridiculing Prince Konoe’s (Prime Minister of Japan at the time) statements on the “Creation of a New Order in East Asia” and the necessary “Unity of East Asia” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence), which Chiang saw as obvious and simple covers for the creation of “an enslaved China” and eventually “further even to subdue the world” (Cheng, Lestz and Spence). Whilst we may see this last claim as hyperbolic, Chiang was actually delineating accurately the trends in Japanese attitudes to ‘Pan Asianism’, which were strengthened by ideas of racial superiority and Japanese nationalism.

Wang seemed to fail to appreciate this, though he was also perhaps misled by the rhetoric of those such as the reasonably moderate general Kanji Ishiwara; it was mainly he and his followers (particularly Inakai Ken and Kagesa Sadaaki) who regulated the relationship between Wang’s regime and the Japanese government (Boyle). They were part of a military clique which saw the Soviet Union as Japan’s main threat and wanted a conciliatory China behind them as they realised they could not fight a two front war. This led them to pressure for a reduction in the demands placed on Wang by the Japanese government, which would have allowed him to be more independent and nationalistic. As the main proponent of a peace movement and negotiations with the Japanese (which led to his defection from Chongqing, and ultimately his collaboration), Wang would have found such rhetoric attractive. However, the clear trends in Japan (perceived by Chiang) of ‘Pan Asianism’ taking the form of Japanese domination over China means that Wang’s claim that he was staying true to Sun Yat-sen’s legacy and the idea of Pan Asianism in general is a fairly poor justification for his collaboration.

Wang’s last testament provides a source for more convincing and genuine justifications though it may have been an attempt to clear his name in Chinese history, because the events of the period support his claims. In it, Wang argues that he collaborated “because of depredations against his people – not in spite of them”; effectively he wished to help those Chinese living in the areas occupied by Japan. This represents a response to possible criticism of his collaboration with those responsible for such atrocities as the Rape of Nanjing. This atrocity ranks “among the worst in the history of modern warfare” for Spence, who cites 20,000 female rape victims, 30,000 fugitive Chinese soldiers hoping to return to civilian life killed and 12,000 civilians massacred (Spence). In the North, in retaliation against the Communist Hundred Regiments Offensive launched from their base in Yan’an, “whole villages were destroyed to the last human being, farm animal and building.” (Spence) This was part of the wider infamous ‘mopping up campaigns’. In the context of this devastation and cruelty, Wang felt he could somewhat stay the Japanese hand in the areas he might control under a collaborationist government. Indeed, as the Japanese became more desperate towards the end of the war and saw Wang as a potential means for conducting a premature peace treaty with China, he was able to delay enemy attacks and “compete” (as he called it) with Japan for possession of Chinese resources and ultimately Chinese sovereignty (“Documents on the Rape of Nanking”). For example, American intelligence personnel were impressed with Wang’s efforts in avoiding the indoctrination of Chinese children under his regime with Japanese propaganda, as he refused to allow the Japanese to determine which textbooks would be used. In classrooms, he personally lectured on Sun’s Three Principles and kept the stories and memory of patriotic heroes from the Song dynasty alive (“Documents on the Rape of Nanking”). Thus, we can begin to understand the reasoning behind Wang’s collaboration and the minor successes he had in helping China from within the Japanese camp.

Another fundamental reason for Wang’s collaboration was a genuine belief that negotiation, even concession, was the most productive and successful route China could pursue after the huge, swift Japanese successes of 1937- 38. Within this short period of time, the Japanese had occupied the most culturally, administratively and economically important areas of Eastern and North China, whilst the Nationalists had displayed a woeful inadequacy to protect China and its people. For example, Chiang had pledged at the start of the war in demagogical fashion that the capital would never fall and gave command for Nanjing’s defence to Tang Shengzi (a former warlord). However, Tang himself fled the city and ordered a general retreat, which turned into a rout (with Chinese soldiers looting civilians for their clothing in order to escape Japanese retribution) due to little central direction (Spence, 1999). Such incidents would have done little to engender a sense of confidence, and for someone who was already disposed to a peace movement rather than continued resistance such as Wang it would have provided evidence of China’s abject weakness. Indeed, in his last testament Wang defends himself on these grounds, claiming, “the desperate plight called for a desperate move” (“Documents on the Rape of Nanking”). However, Mao Zedong represented those who were committed to China’s ‘War of Resistance’ when he claimed in a series of 1938 lectures, “On Protracted War”, that collaboration and compromise was a “danger” to China, acknowledging at the same time that “the social roots of compromise are present” (Mao). He cites that apart from Japan’s allies and “certain elements in the upper strata of other capitalist countries” there is international support for resistance, not collaboration. He also claims that these countries will inevitably support China in its ‘War of Resistance’ despite there being no support forthcoming at the time, emphasising the role of “Soviet support in particular” (Mao). Mao combined this with an explanation of how China will inevitably win a “protracted war” as she is bigger, more progressive (whereas he saw Japan in decline), more populous and in international support, therefore concluding that a ‘War of Resistance’ is the only logical course to take. However, the complete dominance of Japan in the early stages of the war means we should forgive anyone who did not share this optimistic view, and Wang Jingwei clearly did not. The lack of Soviet help due to the pact signed with Germany and then its absolute concentration on Europe after Operation Barbarossa in 1941 was further evidence of Mao being overly confident and deterministic. The tone of his propagandistic statements designed to raise morale and ensure commitment to the anti-Japanese, also somewhat undermines his argument that a ‘War of Resistance’ is the only justifiable course to take. Thus we may see Wang’s collaboration in 1940 as an understandable (if not justifiable) and pragmatic response to a seemingly hopeless situation.

In conclusion, Wang Jingwei’s decision to collaborate with the Japanese in 1940 during the Sino-Japanese War can certainly be understood and explained, but whether it is justifiable is more debatable. In his last testament Wang claimed to do so to protect the people under Japanese occupation and safeguard China as a whole, as he believed that a ‘War of Resistance’ would be disastrous to the nation. In typical Chinese style of looking to the past and tradition, he also cited the long history of Chinese collaboration and concession with barbarians who are superior militarily in order to protect Chinese culture and society. Indeed historian Lin Han-sheng goes so far as to state “collaboration with alien enemies has always been a common phenomenon [in Chinese history]. It has actually enriched China’s culture and enlarged her territory and influence” (“Documents on the Rape of Nanking”). Yet Wang did acquiesce in the giving up of Chinese sovereignty and economic and political autonomy, with the Japanese dominating at all levels of the relationship. However, this was somewhat inevitable given Japan’s overwhelming superiority and successful strategy of dividing China into puppet regimes. Whilst this may be used to criticize Wang for collaborating, it also means that he cannot be held culpable for the developments in the relationship after his collaboration. Thus to some extent Wang’s decision to collaborate can be seen as justifiable. Certainly, the picture is far more complex and sympathetic to Wang than the simple characterisation of Wang as a ‘traitor’ and ‘puppet,’ which both the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party adopt.

References

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China: A Documentary Collection. New York: 1999. Print. Johnson, Chalmers. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. Stanford: 1962.

Print. Mao, Zedong. Selected Works. 1. Beijing: 1965. Print. Mao, Zedong. Selected Works. 2. Beijing: 1965. Print. Documents on the Rape of Nanking. Ed. Timothy Brook. Ann Arbor: 1999. Print.