China: The Next Neocolonial Power in Africa?

CHINA: THE NEXT NEOCOLONIAL POWER IN AFRICA?

By: Carrie Arndt

Abstract

This paper discusses the heightening activity of China in African affairs, which has begun to capture European attention in its potential to shift the international balance of power. China has made great efforts to distinguish itself from the Western legacy of colonialism, exploitation, and intervention politically and economically. China has diametrically opposed itself to the West, claiming fellowship in sharing a history of colonialism by the West in the past. China claims its interactions with Africa are evincive of equality and mutual benefit. Further analysis, however, reveals a more manipulative side of China’s actions that mimics the neocolonialist West which China reputes. In addition to growing political and economic involvement, China is strengthening ties with African nations to gain strength in the UN and shift African interests from the West to the East. These actions, if not further explored and exposed, could escalate into a battle for primacy between China and the West, akin to the Cold War of the 1980s.

While China has been involved in African affairs for decades, its heightening activity in the continent has just now gained the attention of the West. There is no disputing that China has built itself a strong and spreading niche in Africa. While its straightforward approach and purportedly pure economic desire for mutual benefit may seem to set China apart from Europe and the United States – whose international pasts are characterized by complex systems of colonialism and power manipulation –China does reflect Western behavior in several ways. This behavior must be considered only after analyzing how Chinese culture has influenced interpretations of Sino-African relations, and how the interpretations of international interest in the African continent are indeed shared between the two parties. The power balance is shifting, and all eyes are on the East. The future boundaries and allegiances of African nations are linked to the ever-increasing likelihood of conflict. China may project itself as a new actor and profess to play by new rules. However, it’s ultimately on the same global stage as its Western counterparts, and equally driven by the same competitive, aggressive, and ruthless environment.

A first look at Chinese policy in Africa displays restraint, cooperation, and brotherhood between two developing entities. Indeed, China has worked hard to earn its reputation of conducting business that onlookers consider mutually beneficial, earning neither friends nor enemies, but rather business allies (Cheru & Obi 2). Under Zhou Enlais’ Five Principles, political neutrality and cooperative economic growth are heavily emphasized: “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression; non- interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence” (Shinn 5). These tenets clearly distinguish Chinese policy from Western policy, which currently is more interested in political issues of security and counter-terrorism (Shinn 4-5). Additionally, the way in which China conducts its business in Africa focuses on clean-cut cooperation. China’s Export-Import Bank, which is the only state-owned entity used by the government to mete official fiscal assistance, distributes “large scale interest free loans with little or no political conditions attached” (Cheru & Obi 4). Efforts are directly aimed at encouraging “Chinese firms to invest in Africa through export credits, loans for overseas projects and international guarantees” (Shinn 7). Chinese workers in Africa work quickly, cheaply, and with few complications (Junger 2). In fact, in Sebastian Junger’s article, “Enter China, The Giant,” he asserts that “Chinese relations with another country are purely economic,” (Junger 5), while researchers for the 2010 Afrobarometer Studies state “China’s Africa role is...more business- like than any other country’s at any time in the post-war period” (Gadzala & Hanusch 4). In contrast, contributions from the West always come in the form of grants with strings attached, threatening external involvement (Shinn 9). Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi assert in “De-coding China-Africa Relations: Partnership for development or ‘(neo) colonialism by invitation’?” that “Western development partners focus more on policy-based lending to make market works better.” This not only implies intervention in foreign affairs, but also the West’s belief that it is greater and more advanced than other societies (Cheru & Obi 3). China plays off such overt signs of patronage, reminding Africa of its nation’s own time as a semi-colony under Western powers, and declaring no interest in establishing any military bases on the African continent (Shinn 4).

The East and West appear to have very different approaches in interacting with African nations. However, the innocent façade of China’s image cannot be taken at face-value; it must be brought under closer scrutiny. One can easily see that China’s involvement in African affairs is not as simple as it seems. First, Communist China maintains strict control over its meetings and trade agreements and thus can release information as it deems fit. In China, “it is still impossible...to obtain statistics on the annual level of Chinese assistance for each African country...Information on military cooperation rarely extends beyond an announcement of exchange visits, the names of the participants and platitudes about good military ties between the two parties” (Shinn 6). Sino-African affairs are predominantly founded on furtive governmental meetings and closed door bidding processes (Gadzala & Hanusch 6). China’s wall of secrecy can obscure a great deal of the complexities involved in its foreign affairs, but it can only reveal the fact that the world is not a vacuum, and that serious economic interactions cannot be indefinitely hidden. In summary, “economics and politics in Africa do not constitute clearly demarcated distinct spheres” (Gadzala & Hanusch 6). China’s relationship with Africa involves far more blood and sweat of politics and manipulation than its image suggests. After all, China had a significant yet subtle role in African liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s, supporting rebel groups they believed were “pro-China”, strengthening the bonds between Chinese and African armies (Shinn 5-8). Not only does China support military coups, but it’s also unconcerned about prompting them through the lax distribution of materials needed for violence: “China is the only major arms exporter in the world that has refused to sign arms-sales agreements that include human-rights considerations” (Junger 5). Junger goes so far as to assert, “desperate for Africa’s oil, China has been investing hundreds of billions of dollars in pariah regimes – most controversially Sudan – then selling them the weapons to stay in power” (Junger 1). Even the open, economic component of China’s relationship with Africa merits doubt. Currently, the Sino-African trade balance is heavily skewed towards China’s advantage (Gadzala & Hanusch 6). Trade is based upon “highly uneven levels of development and a very different capacity to benefit from such interactions and cooperation...there cannot be genuine win- win development scenarios in such a situation” (Gadzala & Hanusch 5). Chinese behavior, then, does reflect that of its Western counterparts, in its focus on maximizing profit despite endangering innocent lives, by threatening governmental and social structures to in pursuit of its needs and desires and its strive to be the “winner” in trade relations. Several African leaders have noticed these tendencies, and some are not bought over by benefits from Chinese trade to blindly submit to a future in China’s terms. In a brutally honest statement, “South African President Thabo Mbeki has asked if China’s relations with Africa are significantly different than those of the former colonizing powers.” (Shinn 12)

China’s behavior has been interpreted on multiple levels which have led to diverse conclusions – some applauding its mutual-development relations with Africa, others questioning whether Sino-African relations are leading to real development in Africa at all (Junger 3). The unique and distinct culture of the East may play a significant role in how the Chinese themselves reflect on this matter, as well as how it is spun to international audiences. Assiduity, humbleness, and the Communist governmental structure all impact China’s actions and also the way its actions are perceived. Assiduity, which emphasizes diligence, attention, and care, is shown in many aspects of Sino-African relations. First, and most straightforwardly, “both large Chinese companies and small traders assiduously cultivate African markets” (Shinn 3). In addition, Junger, as well as several other sources, claims that “The Chinese think a hundred years in advance” (Junger 3). Most distinct is China’s careful attention to strategy, which gives it an advantage over Western powers. In contrast “to the standard Western doom and gloom analysis of Africa,” the Chinese “portray Africa in a positive light” and emphasize similarities such as “‘common prosperity’ and shared ‘developing country’ status,” rather than assume a paternalistic role and resort to terms such as “‘development assistance’” and “the language of ‘aid’” (Cheru & Obi & Obi 4). This tactic complements nicely the importance of humbleness in Chinese culture. The good grace and emphasis on humbleness are more effective in building stronger, tighter relationships because it neither elevates one partner above the other nor allows for the biases of ethnocentrism –at least on the public level. In sum, “China makes no paternalistic pretense that it is in Africa to help poor Africans develop, or teach them how to govern themselves” (Cheru & Obi 2), while Western powers (in the meantime) fumble and implement policies that portray them as “arrogant and insensitive to the concerns of others” (Shinn 9). A last aspect – the Communist nature of the Chinese state – accounts for several of China’s dissimulating behaviors, which allow Beijing to present a clean and streamlined image of Sino- African relations to the rest of the world. Not only does the Communist government limit access and information as discussed earlier, it also limits all official economic assistance to its state-owned Export-Import Bank (Shinn 6-7), while its national ideology lays the groundwork for ostensible concepts such as cooperation and mutual benefit.

In fact, it appears that China is making increasing efforts to identify with African nations in order to gain their confidence and international political support – which could potentially spark a rift and ignite a realignment of East vs. West alliances in Africa, reminiscent of the Cold war of the 1980s and early 1990s. To be clear, both Western powers, such as the United States, and China desire “political and economic support in international forums from African countries, which constitute more than a quarter of the membership of the UN” (Shinn 1). However, China is at an advantage as it holds more than “22 percent of all US securities owned by foreigners” (Shinn 2). With this edge, China is able to push forward in Africa without meaningful US challenge (Shinn 2). Some African governments have already rejected their so-called “Washington consensus” for a “Beijing consensus” (Cheru & Obi 1). China has overtaken the United States as South Africa’s “biggest export destination” (Gadzala & Hanusch 2).

The relationship between China and Africa in the past creates a foundation for its future. According to David Shinn in “Africa: The United States and China Court the Continent,” “independent African countries were instrumental in supporting Beijing’s admission into the United Nations in 1971” (Shinn 3). Perhaps reciprocally, China intervened and supported African liberation movements during that time period, in which the nation backed “pro-China” revolutionaries in Congo, Burundi, Niger, and Cameroon (Shinn 5-6). In the wake of this exchange, China and the nations of Africa have recognized great potential for gain from one another, resulting in a closer forging of their initial bonds. Today, many African governments and China “support each other in public statements and in the confrontation of criticism from the West” (Shinn 3). China’s emphasis on a shared, semi-colonial history and its alignment with African interests simply laid the pretext for further penetration of China into the continent. China is relying on this buddy-buddy schema to further cultivate its hold over the continent and its control over its “partnering” regimes. Reflectively, China already has widened the governing capacity of Africa’s autocrats in allowing them to “reign in domestic demands for democracy and respect for human rights” – two characteristics that define the Communist nation which is itself consistently criticized for human rights issues (Gadzala & Hanusch 6). Are China’s African allies becoming more “Chinese” in nature, falling into a pattern similar to that of their pseudo-patron?

Regardless, the tide is already turning from West to East: “Favorable views of China outnumber critical judgments by two-to-one or more in nearly every country surveyed” in the 2010 Afrobarometer Table 1.A: African Perceptions of Chinese Engagement across Twenty [Countries] (Gadzala & Hanusch 19). Among these countries number Liberia, which was initially founded by the United States in 1847, and Senegal, which has enjoyed a long and warm Francophonic relationship with France since the early years of independence. Almost 55% of those surveyed in Liberia stated that China helped to the highest degree available as a survey option, while nearly half marked the same in Senegal (Gadzala & Hanusch 19). These nations, once so close and cozy with Western powers, are becoming increasingly receptive to China. Is this another indication that Sino-African relationships are causing substantial power shifts, and pulling the rug from under long-held alliances?

According to Junger, “China is potentially a major strategic competitor...at all levels,” and many “balance-of-power academics [are] predicting a global struggle” (Junger 6). Just like the rest of the great power states across the world, China depends on resources – especially oil – and relationships with amenable nations which can actively bolster its political and economic stance. Ironically, “purely economic” China has shown that it is willing to protect violent and repressive governments in order to secure these gains (Junger 8). Cheru and Obi warn that the world needs to pay attention to, “study and understand the broad ramifications of Chinese history, culture, and engagement...otherwise the emerging [Sino-African] partnership could turn out to represent another phase of ‘neocolonialism’ of Africa. Only this time ‘by invitation’” (Cheru & Obi 6). China is rising, and Africa is growing into its strongest supporter.

Two ultra-powerful entities straddle the globe, occupying diametrically opposed economic and, on occasion human rights positions. Each side feels threatened by the other, and neither dares back down, lest its opponent rise to absolute supremacy. Ensuing build- up of military defense systems, pursuit of neocolonialist interests, and international disputes may escalate until the world begins to wonder, have we reached the point of no return? These phenomena directly explain the Cold War on the 1980s and early 1990s, where the United States was pitted against the Soviet Union. However, how easily can one simply replace the Soviet Union with China to describe a conflict of the future? As indicated, opinions and alliances are shifting in Africa, and neither the United States nor China will be willing to forfeit their power in a continent so instrumental in international economic affairs. Will Africa become the new stage of a second Cold War, falling all too quickly into a new phase of neocolonialism and puppet states? Will fighting between the global giants create new ruptures in the African social fabric, new repression, new chaos, and the ultimate rebirth of a continent under new terms? As Junger proposes, the potential of global struggle “all depends on how... [China manages] the process of their emergence on the world scene” (Junger 6). The remaining question is whether this development will turn China into a violent aggressor, a hostile competitor, a dragon lustful for power, or one that will follow its promised path of mutual development as Africa’s friend and mentor.