Exploring Interbranch Politics and Political Processes:
A Visa for President Lee

BY DANNI LIN

Abstract:
Since the normalization of relations with China in the 1970’s, the US has affirmed the “One China” policy, agreed to reduce arms sales to Taiwan, and upheld a seventeen year policy of barring visits from high-level Taiwanese officials. However, in May 1995, the US deviated from nearly twenty five years of public policy statements and reassurances to China by issuing a visa to President Lee Teng-hui of the ROC of Taiwan. The interbranch politics model, supplemented by the political processes model, elucidates an ostensibly surprising course of action by focusing on executive-legislative relations: President Clinton’s decision to grant a visa to President Lee did not reflect a considered analysis of American interests but rather White House acquiescence to strong pressure from Congress (Allison,22-33). Following an analysis of the decision-making process and theoretical application of the model to the case study, the paper concludes with a brief analysis of the aftermath of the situation, particularly its negative effect on cross-strait relations.

I. Introduction
    China in the 1970’s, the US has affirmed the “One China” policy, agreed to reduce arms sales to Taiwan, and upheld a seventeen year policy of barring visits from high-level Taiwanese officials. However, in May 1995, the US deviated from nearly twenty five years of public policy statements and reassurances to China by issuing a visa to President Lee Teng-hui of the ROC of Taiwan. Initially, the Clinton administration sided with the State Department, which was rightly concerned that granting the visa would disrupt not only growing relations with China but also the rise of crossstrait negotiations (Thies 562). The later decision to approve a visa for President Lee was not the consequence of a “rational” change in the Clinton administration but disagreements between policymakers in a political environment. Therefore, the interbranch politics model supplemented with the political processes model, rather than the rational actor model, elucidates an ostensibly surprising course of action by focusing on executive-legislative relations and the politics surrounding it. President Clinton’s decision to grant a visa to President Lee did not reflect a considered analysis of American interests but rather White House acquiescence to strong pressure from Congress (Allison 22-33).

    The Clinton administration and the State Department staunchly opposed extending a visa by taking into consideration the tenuous diplomatic history between the US and the PRC: US government officials were concerned that China would view a visit by Taiwan’s highest-ranking political official as legitimizing the ROC independence movement and implicating the US as a co-conspirator. I then explore the explanatory background of the interbranch politics and political processes models in preparation for a theoretical application to the
case study in the third and fourth sections. After a detailed look at the various ways the 103rd and 104th US Congresses pushed their pro-Taiwan agenda, it is evident that strong Congressional support for issuing the visa ultimately overrode the policy decision of the executive branch.

II. Executive Branch Perspective: Opposition to President Lee’s Visit
    From the outset, the State Department insisted that issuing a visa would be inconsistent with US policy, which dictated that the relationship between the US and Taiwan was unofficial and would thus exclude normal diplomatic customs. In 1972, the US government signed a second communiqué with China stating that there is only one China (the PRC) and Taiwan is part of that China. In 1979, the US and
China established full diplomatic relations with each other; Congress, however, enacted the Taiwan Relations Act, agreeing to maintain “official” or substantive relations with Taiwan. In 1982, the US government signed a third communiqué to re-affirm its commitment to “One China” and promise to reduce arms sales to Taiwan over the coming years (Hickey 287). Because of such precedents, as late as April of 1995, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher reassured Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that issuing a visa for Lee would be
“inconsistent with [its] unofficial relationship” with Taiwan and against the Clinton administration’s “fundamental policy” on Taiwan (Ross 91). In consensus with the National Security Council, on May 16, 1995, the State Department submitted a report to the Chinese Foreign Ministry stating that despite the efforts of US Congressmen to push a “One China, One Taiwan” policy, changing the current policy of barring travel in the US for Taiwanese politicians, whether the visit was official or private, would be impossible considering the foundations
of Sino-American relations (Zhao 116). Indeed, when the visa was issued, the PRC warned that if President Lee were to make the visit, the consequences would seriously harm relations between China and the US (Carpenter 66).

    The foundations of Sino-American relations were based on what Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State and former Ambassador to China, called a “balancing act” between Beijing and Taipei (Rothberg). The US provided reassurances to the Chinese that there is only “One
China” while maintaining friendship and some unofficial ties (such as arms sales) with Taiwan. A State Department spokesman said that because Lee is the President of Taiwan, the visit would be seen by China as “removing an essential element of unofficiality in the United States-Taiwan relationship” (Greenhouse). Upsetting this balance was precisely what both the Clinton administration and the State Department were concerned about: President Lee’s visit might galvanize the Taiwan separatist movement which the PRC would then interpret as US support for Taiwan’s de jure independence (Thies 562). Looking back, these predictions were well calculated.

    President Lee requested a visa to travel to the US in June of 1995 because he had been invited to speak at the 1995 commencement ceremony at his alma mater, Cornell University. Not surprisingly, the seemingly “unofficial” quality of his visit was immediately questioned
because of Lee’s history of traveling with
a political agenda contrary to that of Beijing
(Rothberg). In 1993, much to China’s
dismay, President Lee began pushing for
two separate sovereign states, the PRC on
the mainland and the ROC on the island
of Taiwan. Part of this campaign involved
“vacation diplomacy” (Carpenter 65) which
would allow Lee to put a human face on
the Taiwan independence issue by meeting
with leaders while on “private vacation.” As
expected, President Lee viewed his trip to
the US as an opportunity to gain political
attention and international support for an
independent Taiwan. Before his visit, President
Lee proposed a donation of $1 billion
to the UN in exchange for a seat in the
world body. Although this offer was perhaps
unrealistic, such dramatic action gained
widespread press. Upon arriving at LAX,
he was greeted by around 150 separatist
supporters waving Taiwanese flags. He
was further greeted by several high-profile
Republican Senators, including Senator
Jesse Helms, then Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, who traveled to New
York to greet him before his speech at Cornell
(Benest).