Xinjiang: A Lost Cause or an Opportunity?

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Source: The New York Times
On September 28th, Thai Police announced that two suspects had confessed to the Bangkok shrine bombing in August, which killed 20 people, including seven from Hong Kong and Mainland China. Thai authorities have linked the bombing to traffickers of Chinese Muslims.[1]

Beijing’s crackdown on religious and human rights in the Northwest Province of Xinjiang motivated thousands of Uyghurs to flee China through Southeast Asia, straining Thailand and surrounding countries capacity to absorb the Chinese minority. A month before the explosion, heeding China’s calls, Thai officials forcibly deported 109 Uyghur refugees back to China.[2]

The coercive deportation and subsequent attack have focused an international spotlight on the Uyghur plight in China. Whether or not the attack was executed by nationalist Uyghurs, Xinjiang experts believe it will impact the Chinese military in Xinjiang, especially regarding immigration policy.[3] President Xi Jinping’s policy of harsh control to quell dissent has intensified the conflict, increased inequality, and escalated bloodshed.[4] How can China quell the terrorism and violence abroad and at home?

I believe it is time for a change in strategy. The Communist Party has the resources to ease tension in the restless province of Xinjiang. Rather than stifling freedom, China ought to alleviate economic and military pressure on Uyghurs, loosen cultural constraints, develop the Uyghur economic and educational sectors, and involve Uyghurs in the political process. Only then will Uyghurs abandon risky efforts to escape Chinese persecution. Even Yu Zhengsheng, one of the seven most powerful men in the CCP, admitted Xinjiang was in the midst of a “severe situation.” He added, “We must clench our fists tight and take the initiative to crack down on violence and terror activities.”[5]

“The problem for Beijing … is that they’ve created a self-fulfilling prophecy,” said Dr. Michael Clarke, an academic expert on oppression in Xinjiang. “In this environment, it is not surprising that some may be turning to globally oriented jihadism as means of combatting what is perceived as Chinese domination or imperialism.”[6]

Chinese History of Oppression in Xinjiang:
 To justify repression of civil rights, China cites the peril of “well-organized” terrorists, although the CIA, among others, contends that China exaggerates the threat of its scapegoat, The East Turkestan Islamic Movement.[7] Isolated individuals have staged strikes more like bombings in Boston and Bangkok than the coordinated attacks in the United States on 9/11. Protests have been spontaneous, not inspired by terrorist groups. For example in the 2009 riots where hundreds of Uyghurs died, the CIA found no evidence of any terrorist involvement in sparking the protests, despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary.[8]
The government’s so-called “War on Terror” is a “War on Uyghurs.” As local government toughens "counterterrorism" policies, the U.S. Congressional Commission on China believes that turmoil has increased.[9] Government oppression debases Xinjiang into a police state, benefiting neither the Chinese government nor Uyghurs. Although the rest of China often dismisses Xinjiang as a mountain frontier populated by folkloric natives, the “New Silk Road” has an expanding transportation infrastructure linking Xinjiang to the rest of China and Central Asia. Uyghur villages are still poor, but the emerging Han middle class increasingly resembles the rest of China.[10]

After Mao’s death, when Uyghurs agitated for autonomy, Beijing began colonizing Xinjiang, and as a result of state-induced migrations, the proportion of Han in Xinjiang jumped from 6 to 40 percent.[11] The CCP created economic incentives to bring Han settlers west. A decade later, technocrats in Beijing unveiled a program called the “Big Development of the Northwest,” which increased the Party’s economic and political control and also brought two million new Han migrants to Xinjiang. Since 2003, Beijing has funneled 300 billion renminbi (50 billion US) to Xinjiang, and despite claims by Beijing, virtually none of it benefitted Uyghurs.[12] Anthony Howell, a professor at Peking University, conducted a study and found that in the capital city of Urumqi, the income of Han Chinese is 30 percent more than that of Uyghurs. This study does not even take into account the economic inequality of rural Uyghurs to that of urban Han Chinese.[13] Because of the CCP’s attitude against Islam, discrimination in hiring is rampant.[14] According to the Asian Development Bank, in Xinjiang, income inequality ranks highest in China.[15]

Although Uyghurs believe Islam is central to their identity, in the past five years, Administration of Religious Affairs has cracked down on religious freedom. State-chosen religious leaders act as governmental figureheads, banning religious activities, disallowing the veil, prohibiting beards, and even razing Uyghur religious architecture from the ancient city of Kashgar. Further, CCP eliminated the Uyghur-language from well-funded government-backed Xinjiang schools, and teachers must renounce Islam.[16]  

“The Chinese Communist Party and regional government have decided that ethnic minority schools must be merged with ethnic Chinese schools and ethnic minority students must be mixed with ethnic Chinese students,” wrote the Xinjiang Daily in 2004. “Teaching should be conducted in Chinese language as much as possible…. Some small towns and counties, where conditions are ripe, must start teaching Chinese to first-grade ethnic minority students in primary school.”[17] Beijing’s policy on the Uyghur language has only become more severe, restricting their freedoms.

As Beijing has increased pressure, clashes with Chinese security forces intensified into a bloody race riot in 2009, sporadic attacks on state institutions, and Uyghur violence against random civilians, Han and Uyghur alike.[18] In October 2014, when a Uyghur couple drove a car through a crowd near Tiananmen Square, killing four, Beijing responded with heavy-hand, dispersing thousands of soldiers across Xinjiang.[19]

Policy Suggestions to Stop the Violence
China must follow its own laws and protect minority cultures, argues Xinjiang Expert Clinton Parker. The solution does not require radical American-style democracy, but rather protection of existing indigenous institutions, support for non-Han cultural expression, development of Uyghur job opportunities, and encouragement of autonomous political and governmental administration.[20] All these rights are embodied in the Chinese Constitution. This political system, despite similarities to a republic under the Soviet Union, was shaped by the CCP for China, and it functioned well in the 1950s, when Xinjiang was designated the “Uyghur Autonomous Region,” and in the 1980s, during Deng Xiaoping’s rule. The constitutional system of semi-autonomy remains popular with minorities, though they have never been afforded true autonomy.[21]

In Xinjiang, an ethnic-sharing regime controlled early autonomous legislative and executive institutions. Clinton Parker, author of The Uyghurs of China, points out that the CCP created a “United Front” policy that established links with “progressive members” of religious and social elites, and in turn involved minimal interference with business, religious practice, or social norms.[22] These power-sharing institutions created economic initiatives appropriate to rural conditions, renewed cultural and scientific projects run by Uyghurs, and transferred political power from Hans to Uyghurs.[23]

Along with quelling Uyghur protests, China can also save face on the international stage. Although China does not anticipate intrusion on its sovereignty, given global turmoil, increased violence could result in sanctions by the international community through the UN and WTO. What’s at stake, too, is China’s global reputation. For decades, China has sought to be viewed as competitor to the United States. But civic uprisings and violations of human rights make China look weak. Some believe, like New York Times’ Edward Wong, that China’s failures in human rights could encourage Tibet and Taiwan to strengthen their pursuit of independence.

Another symbol of Han governmental incompetence is the “Xinjiang Minority Street” project in Urumqi. Instead of consulting Uyghurs, who might have opted for a mosque or homeless shelter, the CCP invested 24 million in a fancy, five-story market that has never been occupied.  City Councils and regional congresses must learn to respect the opinion of Uyghurs.[24] If Xi Jinping were to consummate his promises of eradicating corruption in Xinjiang, he would gain Uyghur’s respect and also add to China’s financial reserves.

The road is clear. Uyghurs must be given political autonomy, or else turmoil will persist in Xinjiang and abroad. Political and economic institutions that exist in Xinjiang must be cleared of corruption. Economic benefits must be granted to Uyghurs. Government investment in heavy industries that benefit corrupt Hans must be diverted to greater public good. Beijing holds a monopoly of force in Xinjiang; therefore, these policies are just as feasible as their current strong-handed tactics. The CCP has allowed their fear of losing Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, and bigotry towards Uyghurs to blind them in their treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang. A power-sharing resolution of this conflict will enhance China’s stature not only within its borders, but globally, too. I believe that if China can improve the lives of Uyghurs, violence will subside. From Nigeria to Ukraine to Ferguson, Mo., pluralism and questions of identity today are a global challenge, and China now has an opportunity to embrace policies that can set a standard for other nations. China now has the power to solve this problem. What China needs is the will.
 
 
References
[1] Lee, Peter, “Erawan bombing: Uyghurs, Turkey & passports … or Thai human trafficking, corruption… and Uyghur patsies?” Asia Times. September 11, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2015. http://atimes.com/2015/09/erawan-bombing-uyghurs-turkey-passports-or-thailand-human-trafficking-corruption-and-uyghur-patsies/
[2] Vanderklippe, Nathan, “Thailand bomb blast puts spotlight on China crackdown on Uyghurs,” Globe and Mail. September 16, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2015. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/thailand-bomb-blast-puts-spotlight-on-china-crackdown-on-uighurs/article26376972/
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Phillips, Tom. “‘A brighter future beckons': China tries to get Xinjiang to join the party.” The Guardian. October 9, 2015. Accessed October 12, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/a-brighter-future-beckons-china-tries-to-get-xinjiang-to-join-the-party
[6] Ibid.
[7] Clarke, Michael. "China's “War on Terror” in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uighur Separatism." Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008, 271-301.
[8] Gracie, Carrie, “Xinjiang: Has China's crackdown on 'terrorism' worked?” BBC. January 2, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30373877
[9] Forsythe, Michael. “Deadly Attacks in Xinjiang Go Unreported in China” New York Times. February 26th, 2015. Accessed September 29, 2015. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/deadly-attacks-in-xinjiang-go-unreported-in-china/?_r=0
[10] “Why is there tension between China and the Uighurs?” BBC, September 26th, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-26414014
[11] Ibid.
[12] Kessel, Jonah, “Taxi Ride in Xinjiang Reveals Ethnic Strains” New York Times, December 23, 2014. September 11, 2015. http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/taxi-ride-in-xinjiang-china-reveals-ethnic-strains/
[13] Howell, Anthony, ““Chinese Minority Income Disparity in Urumqi” China: An International Journal. December, 2013. Accessed September 29, 2015. https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/china/v011/11.3.howell.pdf
[14] Ibid.
[15] Clarke, Michael. “Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia - A History” Taylor & Francis, 2011, 55-75.
[16] Ide, William, “More than 800 Arrested in Widening Xinjiang Crackdown” VOA. August 15, 2014. Accessed September 29, 2015. http://www.voanews.com/content/more-than-800-arrested-chinas-widening-xinjiang-crackdown/2414205.html
[17] Dwyer, Arienne M “The Xinjiang Conflict,” East-West Center Washington (2005): 120
[18] Wong, Edward. "China Moves to Calm Restive Xinjiang Region." New York Times, May 31, 2014. Accessed February 17, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/31/world/asia/chinas-leader-lays-out-plan-to-pacify-restive-region.html.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Parker, Clinton. "The Uyghurs of China: A Struggle of Past, Present, and Future." UKnowledge. January 1, 2011. Accessed February 17, 2015. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/kaleidoscope/vol10/iss1/29.
[21] Alperen, Michael. “Foundations of Homeland Security: Law and Policy” John Wiley and Sons, 2008, 337-345.
[22] Parker
[23] Clarke, Michael. “Xinjiang and China's Rise in Central Asia"
[24] Page, Jeremy, “As Muslim Uighurs Flee, China Sees Jihad Risk.” The Wall Street Journal. February 2nd, 2015. Accessed February 17, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-muslim-uighurs-flee-china-sees-jihad-risk-142266628

John Patrick Thomas is a junior at Duke University.