Actions Speak Louder than Words: Greater Power Politics in the South China Sea

Source: The Economist
“One Prince of the present time never preaches anything but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile. Either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time.”

                                                                          -Nicollo Machiavelli, “The Prince”, Chapter XVIII
Note: The views expressed in this piece are of the author's alone, and do not reflect the views of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

The Chinese government is constructing two contradictory narratives about its rise as a major power: one based on rhetoric, the other upon action. Rhetorically, Chinese politicians and diplomats broadcast a message of China’s peaceful ascent on the world stage. However, the actions of the Chinese government are at odds with this narrative. There are a number of examples of this trend, but in this article I will focus upon the South China Sea. Since January, China has used land reclamation techniques to increase the total size of its claims in the South China Sea from 500 to 2,000 acres [1]. Alarmingly, a senior Chinese military officer has openly stated that the reclamation is for military purposes [2]. China has already begun building runways on Fiery Cross Reef and at other locations [3], and all despite protests from competing claimants to the waters and islands in the South China Sea. 


Source: American Interest


In late May the U.S. Navy flew a CNN crew over the land reclamation activities in a P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft [4]. While flying over the area, the P-8 received a radio communication saying -- in English -- “This is the Chinese navy. Please go away… to avoid misunderstanding” [5]. The Chinese military regularly uses these types of tactics to intimidate the U.S. Navy and other regional actors into staying away from its claims. Despite the broad expression of concern over China’s actions at forums such as the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, Beijing remains defiant. This is now sparking concerns over whether or not China will attempt to deny freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, a key tenet of American foreign policy and the current liberal international world order. An early indicator of such intentions came from then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, who said in 2010 that “China is a big country, and other countries are small, and that is just a fact” [6].

This is not the only time that China has acted unilaterally in the South China Sea. In May of 2014, China placed an oil rig within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Vietnam [7]. The Vietnamese government made an official complaint in reference to the 1972 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) -- which states that EEZ’s extend 200 nautical miles from a country’s above water territory [8] -- and protesters attacked Chinese citizens and assets within Vietnam. This led to two deaths, over a hundred injured, millions of dollars in property destroyed, and an evacuation of Chinese citizens by the Chinese government [9]. Beijing, however, simply asserted that the rig was within its “nine-dashed line”, which is used to symbolize to China’s claims to the majority of the South China Sea [10]. China also ruffled feathers when it attempted to block the re-supplying of a Filipino defensive station set up to defend Manila’s claim to the Spratly Islands, located a very short distance from the coast of the Philippines [11]. The station is a ship run aground on Reed Bank to mark Filipino territory. Reed Bank is a mere 80 nautical miles from the western shores of Palawan, a major Filipino island, and a little shy of 500 miles from the southernmost tip of China [12]. This distance is a major reason why Beijing’s claims to the Spratly Island chain are considered illegitimate by other claimants. 
Source: IHS Jane's 360
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently told reporters that “China's determination to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity is as hard as a rock”, and that sovereignty is “the people's demand of the government and our legitimate right” [13]. However, other nations also have economic and strategic interests to consider, as well as the demands of their own domestic constituencies. If China is to become a respected regional power, it must not insist upon bilateral negotiations with other claimants in which it holds an unfair amount of economic and military advantage. Instead, it should accept international arbitration on the issue at hand. This is much more likely to procure a fair and unbiased result, and would also help to alleviate the impression that China is a “revisionist power” and a “bully”, subverting global norms.

Many scholars and defense analysts believe China is pursuing an ‘Anti-Access, Area Denial’ (A2/AD) strategy along its maritime periphery. This is likely aimed at preventing the United States from supporting allied nations in the event of an attack [14]. One example often highlighted is the deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles on the Chinese side of the Taiwan Strait, which is believed to be capable of neutralizing American aircraft carriers. During the 1996 elections in Taiwan, China began provocative military drills near the Strait with live ammunition and missile tests [15]. These were viewed by many as intended to influence the election, or possibly serve as a precursor to invasion if the pro-independence politician Lee Teng-Hui were elected [16]. At the time President Clinton ordered two Navy carrier-led battle groups to the Taiwan Strait to send a message that the United States would defend Taiwan [17]. Many military scholars view these relatively recent deployments of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile as a possible counter to future protective action by the United States [18]. Similarly, China’s land grabs and creation in the South China Sea can be viewed as preventative measures against American access to areas along China’s periphery if necessary. Having outposts that far from the Chinese mainland would undoubtedly bolster China’s ability to control the sea-lanes within these waters.

On the surface China’s actions seem to be revisionist, but one must consider the broader strategy that the CCP is pursuing. Beijing likely sees its actions as legitimate, since they are intended to secure China’s economic viability--$5.3 trillion (USD) in goods passes through the Straits of Malacca annually [19] along with 70-85% of Chinese oil imports [20]. This creates a strategic dilemma for China. It is widely believed that the U.S. Navy could cut off a significant portion of China’s energy imports by simply blocking the Straits—a mere 1.7 miles wide at their narrowest point [21]. It is likely that China’s provocative actions in the South China Sea are part of a broader goal of economic and energy security. However, it is also likely that Beijing seeks to use its military outposts there to further consolidate its control over the Spratly and Paracel island chains, as well as serve as a forward operating base for its Navy.

If the leadership in Beijing continues to conduct foreign affairs in its current manner, it can likely expect that the nations along its periphery, as well as powers from further afield such as the United States, will consolidate efforts and create a common defense against Chinese incursions. What this would look like is difficult to predict. We might see further joint economic efforts through mediums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). We may as see a further alignment of defense policy among the region’s actors, as we can see with Washington’s relaxation of sanctions against selling military equipment to Vietnam, or in the new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the U.S.

The nations of Southeast Asia, as well as the United States, remember how the region came to be dominated by Japan. It began with the Meiji Restoration, which led to massive economic development, followed by major investments in the Japanese military, which became the most capable and powerful in the region. The power balance leaned further and further towards Japan, which allowed for Japan to act unilaterally against its neighbors. In more recent times, a similar phenomenon has occurred. In the last several decades no major economy has developed as fast as China. Chinese military spending has also increased at an astounding rate of 9.5% annually from 2005 to 2014 [22]. These facts conjure up unsettling parallels. I do not believe China is an expansionist power, but domination does not require outright invasion. Many nations in the region fear that China seeks to control them economically and militarily. The famous military philosopher Sunzi stated that the outcome of all battles are determined before they are fought [23]. To the military strategists in the capitals of Southeast Asia, it appears that China is striving to do exactly that: determine the outcome of any conflict before one even takes place. Through military maneuvering and economic domination, China is causing neighboring nations to capitulate and submit to Chinese suzerainty without the need for outright confrontation. Regional actors cannot afford to ignore China’s economy, nor can they afford to confront China’s military. Without the military umbrella of the United States, they’d be even more vulnerable.

The United States has no special enmity towards China, and does not seek to subjugate the Chinese people. Since the end of World War II, it has been U.S. policy in Europe and Asia to ensure that no regional actor becomes so powerful that it can dominate its neighbors, as Japan and Germany did at great expense [24]. The U.S. government believes that to have peace and prosperity in East Asia, it is necessary to have a defensive balance. If China is not expansionist, if it merely seeks regional stability and economic prosperity, it should have nothing to fear from American military presence in the region.  After all, without the capacity of the U.S. military placating leaders from Tokyo to New Delhi, regional militaries would be further incentivized to ensure security against the rapidly modernizing Chinese military. The United States does not seek to contain China but rather to create a balance in the Asia-Pacific -- a balance that emphasizes engagement with China as well as with other nations in the region. Peace can only come from cooperation between the United States and China. Competition is inevitable, but it must be balanced with vigorous cooperation.

In “The Art of War”, Sunzi asserts that all warfare is based upon deception. China continually constructs mixed narratives, one based upon action, the other upon rhetoric. Rhetorically, China mollifies regional leaders with a narrative of a benign ascension -- one which its neighbors are eager to consume. But when it comes to action, China is making a purely realist calculation, seeking to solidify military outposts far afield from its sovereign territory. This is an unfortunate trend which will likely lead the United States and China into a Thucydides Trap. 

 
References

1 - "US: China Pursuing Huge S. China Sea Land Reclamation." Defense News. Agence France-Presse, 10 May 2015. Web. 10 June 2015.

2 - Shimada, Gaku. "Calming the Waters: China Says Land Reclamation Project to Be 'completed Soon'- Nikkei Asian Review." Nikkei Asian Review. Nikkei Asian Review, 17 June 2015. Web. 28 June 2015.

3 - Garnaut, Josh, and David Wroe. "China Moves Weapons on to Artificial Islands in South China Sea." The Sydney Morning Herald. N.p., 28 May 2015. Web. 15 June 2015.

4 - "China Warns US Spy Plane over South China Sea Flyover." China Warns US Spy Plane over South China Sea Flyover. The World News, 22 May 2015. Web. 17 June 2015.

5 – Ibid.

6 - "The Dragon's New Teeth." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 07 Apr. 2012. Web. 10 June 2015.

7 - Zhu, Charlie, Fiona Li, and Nguyen Phuong Linh. "China Oil Rig Finishes First Phase of Drilling in Waters Claimed by Vietnam." Reuters. Ed. Dean Yates. Thomson Reuters, 27 May 2014. Web. 13 June 2015.

8 - "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." Article 57 (n.d.): n. pag. United Nations. Web. 18 June 2015.

9 - Hutzler, Charles. "China Evacuates More Than 3,000 of Its Citizens From Vietnam." Wall Street Journal. N.p., 18 May 2014. Web. 16 June 2015.

10 – Ibid.

11 - Conde, Chichi, Karl John Reyes, and Abigail Kwok. "Malacanang: Reed Bank Is 80 Miles from Palawan, 500 Miles from China." InterAksyon.com. N.p., 9 June 2011. Web. 19 June 2015.

12 – Ibid.

13 - Brunnstrom, David, and Michael Martina. "U.S., China Clash over Disputed South China Sea." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 16 May 2015. Web. 14 June 2015.

14 - "The Dragon's New Teeth." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 07 Apr. 2012. Web. 10 June 2015.

15 - Lewthwaite, Gilbert A. "Clinton Sends Another Carrier-led Task Force Biggest U.S. Navy Group in Asia since Vietnam Era Packs Aircraft, Missiles." The Baltimore Sun, 12 Mar. 1996. Web. 12 June 2015.

16 – Ibid.

17 – Ibid.

18 - Mishkin, Sarah. "China Deploys Anti-ship Missile off Taiwan - FT.com."Financial Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 June 2015.

19 - "China's Maritime Disputes." A CFR InfoGuide Presentation. The Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. Web. 18 June 2015.

20 – Daniel, Brutlag. "China's Reliance on Shipping Oil Through the Straits of Malacca." (n.d.): n. pag. Tufts, May 2011. Web. 19 June 2015.

21 – Ibid.

22 – Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2010. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 07 Apr. 2015. Web. 28 May 2015.

23 - Sunzi. Sun Tzǔ on the Art of War, the Oldest Military Treatise in the World. Trans. Lionel Giles. London: Luzac, 1910. Print. Chapter 1, Principle #18.

24 - Kissinger, Henry. "Toward an Asian Order: Confrontation or Partnership?"World Order. New York: Penguin, 2014. 233. Print.

Peter Loftus is an incoming International Relations Masters student at the Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.