Chinese Nationalism
It can be created. But can it be contained?

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Source: Wall Street Journal
Note: The views expressed in this piece are of the author's alone, and do not reflect the views of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

To understand what type of power China will be in the future, it is imperative to understand the effects of nationalism on Chinese foreign policy. The failures of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the brutally suppressed democracy protests at Tiananmen, and the PRC’s turn towards a market economy are all indicative of a loss of faith in socialism. China needs a new ideology to supplement the social cohesion that socialism provided. Chinese leaders are increasingly opting to utilize nationalism for this purpose, as well as to legitimize the CCP’s authority. However, nationalism is not only directed top-down. Grassroots nationalism can play a significant role in influencing Chinese foreign policy decisions as well. If the government thinks it can control the nationalistic impulses of its population, it is mistaken. In an increasingly adversarial region, the Chinese government may be overwhelmed by the patriotic impulses of its people. By supporting nationalism, it may be sowing the seeds of its own demise.

In the Chinese case, there are two types of nationalism: cultural and political.[1] The former refers to respect for Chinese history and aspects of culture, whereas the latter focuses on the modernization and advancement of the nation-state. These two branches of nationalism have historically been at odds with one another.[2] From the beginning of the Century of Humiliation, which started with the First Opium War in 1840, the Chinese intelligentsia has contemplated what factors have made China weaker than the European colonial powers and Japan. Many political nationalists saw Chinese culture, Confucianism in particular, as being backward and a hindrance to modern development. During the Communist era, Mao Zedong saw Confucianism in a similar light, and sought to replace Chinese history and culture with an enlightened socialist society. In the modern era, although these two divisions of nationalism are still occasionally at odds, they are much more mutually supportive. Chinese cultural nationalism is driving the current Chinese soft power initiative, while political nationalists seek to implement economic, social, and political reforms that will strengthen the PRC.

Although nationalism often originates in grassroots movements, there are also powerful mechanisms in China for forming and harnessing collective patriotic sentiment. During Mao’s reign, the creation of the “self” and the “other” allowed for the Party to demonize outside powers, especially the U.S. and Japan, while emphasizing the unity all 56 ethnic groups that reside within China.[3] To maintain this “us versus them” mentality, the Chinese government uses its control of state media to deliver certain messages to the Chinese people. It then utilizes its massive censorship apparatus to filter the foreign content and unapproved domestic perspectives its population is exposed to. The CCP can use these powers to either foster greater nationalistic sentiment, or to curtail it when it may be growing too intense. Several examples of this are the accidental bombing by the U.S. of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the 2001 collision of an American P-3 surveillance aircraft with a Chinese military aircraft near Hainan Island, and the ongoing dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In each of these instances, the Chinese government used its control over information to establish a narrative in line with the foreign and domestic policy initiatives of the central government in Beijing.

Furthermore, there are several reasons why the government might want to incite greater nationalism amongst its people. The first is that protests, such as the ones that were held following the Japanese nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands allow for Chinese diplomats to argue that their hands are tied by public sentiment, and that they can’t fully compromise.[4] Secondly, by demonizing foreign powers, the CCP is able to more fully consolidate power, as can be seen in the past as well as in the present. By 1977 the Cultural Revolution had significantly discredited the legitimacy of socialism, and the only significant cohesion in China came from broad anti-Japanese sentiment.[5] This general antipathy towards China’s wartime oppressor was one cohesive element that held the Middle Kingdom together during the transition from Hua Guofeng to Deng Xiaoping.[6] In a similar way, Xi Jinping has utilized nationalism to consolidate his power within the Chinese Communist Party, especially in regards to the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee and the military.[7]

In addition to demonizing foreign powers to solidify the legitimacy of the CCP, the Party can also point to its various success stories to gain the support of the governed. Massive infrastructure projects, successful Olympic bids and awe-inspiring skyscrapers all feed into China’s growing nationalism and the narrative of China’s ascent as a great power. Despite the recent slowing of the economy, over the last two decades China has experienced break-neck growth, inciting envy from many nations across the globe. Even now, central government still projects around 7% growth this year—higher than almost anywhere else in the world. The CCP is able to point to tumultuous politics in places like the United States and Australia to argue that China’s form of technocratic governance is effective in procuring results, and that democratic reforms would jeopardize this progress. This mixture of nationalism and economic success bolstering the legitimacy of an authoritarian regime is what Jessica Chen Weiss of Cornell University calls “authoritarian resilience."[8]

As mentioned before, the flames of nationalism can be difficult to contain. The advance of technology can make it very difficult to prevent the spread of patriotic articles, whether or not they are valid.[9] One issue that has arisen is that of “clickbait”, which is the use of eye-catching but misleading article titles to attract people’s attention.  In July Foreign Policy ran an article entitled “China’s Clickbait Nationalism” which describes how Global Times, a fervently nationalistic Chinese newspaper, would distort, repackage and misinterpret the statements of Japanese politicians and officials in order to garner more views from patriotic Chinese netizens.[10] When the public is consuming false or distorted information, certain narratives are formed that cannot be easily dispelled. If an incident between China and Japan were to occur and nationalistic sentiment in the PRC were to skyrocket, the government in Beijing would likely feel added pressure to “teach Japan a lesson”.

This is where nationalism can be inwardly threatening. If the Party is not assertive in standing up to foreign incursions then the people may rise up against the government, as seen in the fall of both the Qing Dynasty and the regime of Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-Shek.[11] The current Communist government almost experienced a similar fate when the 1985 anti-Japanese protests morphed into a democracy movement that ended in the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989.[12]

In addition to the issue of its containment, unchecked nationalism can cause other nations to doubt China’s narrative of a “peaceful rise."[13] China is fearful of being “contained” by the United States and its neighbors, and if it does too much to incite their suspicion, such as becoming too nationalistic in rhetoric and action, confrontation with foreign powers is a possibility. There has been a significant increase in nationalist sentiment in China because of Beijing’s sovereignty claims over the South China Sea as well as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. With these disputes gaining more and more international attention, Beijing will have to act carefully. If it backs down, the government may be viewed as weak domestically and internationally. If it acts too aggressively, foreign powers could view China as a threat that needs to be contained.

When in power, Deng Xiaoping had a philosophy called tao guang yang hui (韬光养晦), meaning “to hide one’s capacity and bide one’s time.” Deng realized that in the 1970’s and 1980’s, China was relatively weak compared to other international powers. The implicit message here was that once China became more powerful, it could assert itself more forcefully on the international stage. Xi Jinping’s introduction of “great power relations” as a key tenant of Chinese foreign policy signifies an ideational shift away from “quietly biding one’s time” towards being a more proactive player in global affairs. As China becomes an indispensable power, it is imperative that the CCP keeps this “nationalism dilemma” in mind. Patriotism is a powerful weapon that can be used to create useful narratives for the consumption of a populace. However, if the government does not live up to expectations, nationalism can become a double-edged sword, pushing the Party towards confrontation with the outside world, lest it be overthrown. That being said, this would not be an unusual phenomenon in Chinese history; in fact, it would conform to precedent. 
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References
[1] Walton, Jonathan, “Chinese Nationalism and Its Future Prospects”, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 27 June 2012, accessed 14 November 2015, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=258
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Fish, Eric, “A Glimpse Into Chinese Nationalism”, The Diplomat, 7 November 2014, accessed 14 November 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-glimpse-into-chinese-nationalism/
[5] Bajoria, Jayshree, “Nationalism in China”, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 April 2008, accessed 14 November 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/nationalism-china/p16079
[6] Ibid.
[7] Cookson, John, “The Real Threat of Chinese Nationalism”, The National Interest, 28 August 2015, accessed 14 November 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-threat-chinese-nationalism-13729
[8] Ibid.
[9] Bajoria, Jayshree, “Nationalism in China”, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 April 2008, accessed 14 November 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/nationalism-china/p16079
[10] Dong, Yifu, “China’s Clickbait Nationalism”, Foreign Policy, 25 July 2015, accessed 14 November 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/25/china-clickbait-nationalism-japan-war/
[11] Cookson, John, “The Real Threat of Chinese Nationalism”, The National Interest, 28 August 2015, accessed 14 November 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-threat-chinese-nationalism-13729
[12] Ibid.
[13] Bajoria, Jayshree, “Nationalism in China”, Council on Foreign Relations, 23 April 2008, accessed 14 November 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/nationalism-china/p16079

Peter Loftus is an International Relations Masters student at the Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.
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