Greater Power Politics in Central Asia
Russia, China, and the Future of Central Asia

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Source: Business Insider
Note: The views expressed in this piece are of the author's alone, and do not reflect the views of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

Introduction

The world is experiencing a profound restructuring in global power dynamics. In terms of major geopolitical events, the war against the Islamic State, the conflict in Ukraine, and Chinese activity in the South China Sea likely come to mind. One area of great geostrategic importance that is often overlooked is Central Asia—a region ripe for competition. Rich in resources and consisting of relatively small states governed by autocrats, this region is seen by many analysts as vulnerable to the spread of extremist ideology. These nations were a part of the Soviet Union prior to its dissolution and Moscow still plays a major role in their security, political, and economic affairs. However, China’s influence is increasingly permeating into regional capitals, and how Moscow and Beijing compete or cooperate in the future will do much to determine the future of Central Asia.
 
Security in Central Asia: A Case for Cooperation

Neither Moscow nor Beijing are keen to see democracy spread in Central Asia, and they have reasonable cause to be wary; both powers are concerned that an “Arab Spring” in the region could destabilize already weak governance structures and cause significant security externalities for both nations. Narcotics trafficking and the threat of terrorism also plague Central Asia, and these issues could spread into neighboring countries if a crisis were to occur. In terms of security, Russia is a core partner, and Beijing tends to see Moscow’s involvement there as a bulwark of stability.
 
Russian security operations in the region have several objectives. The first is the establishment of an effective intelligence apparatus in Central Asia, led by Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Federal Security Service (FSB). Russia also maintains military bases in the region under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Moscow seeks to check the American military presence in the region, which was primarily there to support the war in Afghanistan. Although they both understand the U.S. activities in the area are to prevent a resurgence of terrorist networks in Afghanistan, neither Moscow nor Beijing are comfortable with a long-term American military presence in Central Asia.
 
Economics: A Case for Competition
 
Aside from security concerns, economics is a core factor in the geopolitical calculus of the region, especially in regards to energy. Energy exports are a key component of Russia’s national strategy, and Moscow is attempting to incorporate the nations of Central Asia into its pipeline network. Russia is doing its best to ensure that this gas does not flow to Europe, (currently a strategic adversary) and instead goes eastward. This strategy is complemented by the 2014 agreement between Presidents Putin and Xi for Russia to sell $400 billion in natural gas to China over thirty years. Despite its hyperactive strategic maneuvering, Russia’s stumbling economic growth will likely damage its influence in Central Asia. European and American sanctions, the ruble’s significant depreciation in 2015, and the currently low price of oil and gas have all had a significant effect on the Russian economy.

Conversely, in Central Asia, China is pulling ahead in the commercial, financial, and investment sectors, and in 2015, regional trade with China surpassed that of Russia for the first time. Just as Russia is a major source of fossil fuels for China, Central Asia is valuable region as well: the China-Central Asia network of pipelines could eventually supply China with up to 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, which would be more than half of China’s gas imports. This, along with the natural gas deal with Russia, would be a crucial advancement in ensuring China’s energy security, which is currently heavily dependent on fossil fuel imports from the Middle East and Africa.

In regards to Central Asia, Beijing’s economic and security concerns often overlap. China’s Xinjiang province, especially the southern portion, is primarily ethnic Uighur and arguably has more in common with its Central Asian neighbors than with the predominantly ethnic Han population of China. Along with the nations of Central Asia, most Uighurs are ethnically Turkic and speak a Turkic language as well as practice Islam. However, ethnic Han migration to Xinjiang, economic grievances among non-Han ethnic groups, religious restrictions, and various other factors have led to significant tensions such as inter-communal riots. That being said, Beijing is eager to cooperate with the governments of Central Asia to ensure that insurgencies and extremism do not become problematic, as it could easily spread into Xinjiang.

The Chinese state is making a thorough effort to improve the economic situation of Xinjiang minorities while also tamping down separatism and terrorism, both of which are often conflated with one another. In order to further this objective, the Chinese government is seeking to develop Xinjiang economically and establish greater trade links with Central Asia. An excellent example of this is the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, a project that seeks to resurrect the old Silk Road by building up infrastructure connecting China and Europe. This strategy would bring enormous infrastructure investment to Xinjiang and Central Asia and would be a catalyst in linking regional economies. However, whether or not the economic developments that comes from projects such as this can remedy Uighur discontent has yet to be seen.
           
Cooperation, Competition, or Both?
 
An important factor that suggests cooperation is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose members include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (India and Pakistan have also been approved for membership but are not yet formal members). The SCO was originally established to stabilize and demilitarize the borders of the newly formed states in Central Asia post-Soviet collapse. Today, it gives China and Russia a medium by which to interact and cooperate, especially in regards to three common concerns: upholding political stability in Central Asia, safeguarding secular regimes, and promoting economic development in the region. The SCO is a useful mechanism that helps Russia and China to set the “rules for the game” in Central Asia, which will help the two to engage in coordinated competition.

Despite such cooperation, it is also possible to argue that Russia and China are in fact competing for influence. Moscow views Central Asia as its strategic backyard and is unlikely to be receptive to greater Chinese influence in the region. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European Union and NATO have made significant inroads into Russia’s former sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. That being said, Russia is unlikely to be amenable to a significant Chinese role in Central Asia beyond the economic realm, since this would further erode Russia’s influence in what it views as its strategic neighborhood. As Wang Tao, a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, recently advised, “China would do well to approach the partnership [with Russia] with a bit more caution and less fantasy.”

Thus far, the competition has been primarily limited to the commercial sphere. For example, when China expressed an interest in creating a Free Trade Area within the SCO, Russia pushed back. Moscow likely prefers economic integration via its own scheme, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) instead of being subsumed under China’s “One-Belt, One-Road” initiative. However, at the SCO meeting in 2015, a working group was established to explore the possibility of merging these two initiatives , which would give Russia added Chinese investment, and would give China easier access to European markets. If this arrangement were to come about, Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Moscow Center suggests that “China would be the bank, and Russia would be the ‘big gun’.” Be as it may, perhaps Russia and China could potentially create a symbiotic relationship in Central Asia after all.
 
Conclusion
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Although there is much to gain from cooperation between these two powers, there are also benefits in exercising sole hegemony over Central Asia. It is probable that Russia’s geopolitical power will decline over the long-term while China’s will rise, which will likely create a power imbalance that will spark greater competition between Moscow and Beijing. For the time being though, these two powers seem more content to cooperatively press against the U.S.-led liberal international order, support secular authoritarian regimes, and deepen economic ties, which will likely mean that Central Asia will be an area for Sino-Russian cooperation in the near future.  

Peter Loftus is an International Relations Masters student at the Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.