How China's Community of Common Destiny Will Change Asia

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Source: BBC
Note: The views expressed in this piece are of the author's alone, and do not reflect the views of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

In an attempt to assert itself as a major power in East Asia, China has created the concept of a Community of Common Destiny (CCD). What exactly this framework entails is hard to decipher, but it seems to revolve around economic initiatives which place China at the center of the regional dynamic. The two main pillars of the CCD are the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. These concepts seek to revive an earlier era when China was the center around which the regional economic and political order revolved. Whether or not regional nations will subscribe to China’s new East Asian order has yet to be determined, and will largely be influenced by how China’s neighbors view it as a rising power. They may view the CCD as an opportunity for mutual advancement alongside China, or as a potential threat to their independence as China seeks to gain influence throughout the region.

As of yet, the Chinese government has released very few concrete details on what the CCD would actually entail.[1] What we do know is that the term was first used in 2007 by Hu Jintao at the 17th National Party Congress in reference to the Mainland’s relations with Taiwan.[2] Current Chinese President Xi Jinping began speaking of the CCD when he came to power in 2012,[3] and what he has said so far about it is this:
  • “We need to make sure that all countries respect one another and treat each other as equals.”[4]
  • “We need to seek win-win cooperation and common development.”[5]
  • “We need to pursue common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.”[6]
  • “We need to ensure inclusiveness and mutual learning among civilizations.”[7]

In an attempt to articulate the potential benefits of Chinese regional leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is constructing a narrative centered on the Community of Common Destiny. Beijing is beginning to link the AIIB, the One Belt One Road initiative, and the CCD in a new China-centered ideational framework for the region.

There are various arguments to be made for why China should be the predominant power in East Asia. These arguments revolve primarily around China’s economic importance. Beijing often makes the argument that regional economies are closely interconnected, and that 1% economic growth in China equates to 0.3% growth in the broader region.[8] China also has ample foreign exchange reserves (the largest in the world) that it is eager to spend on soft power projection.[9] This is good news for a region that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) says needs $8 trillion in infrastructure investment between 2010 and 2020.[10] China is also keen to advance the historical narrative of its centrality in the East Asian economic and political order, but it is questionable how eager China’s neighbors are to accept this.

China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative has the potential to advance the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which would be beneficial to all parties involved.[11] China is already ASEAN’s largest trading partner, and Beijing has a goal of $1 trillion in bilateral trade by 2020.[12] In addition to this China-ASEAN FTA, China is also eager to advance the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) agreement. However, this program has been somewhat stalled by the recent signing of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The FTAAP would have the benefit of taking numerous regional FTA’s and incorporating them into a larger one— streamlining regulation, procedures, and standards for greater efficiency.[13] This can be seen as another step into the future for APEC.[14]

China is currently trying to construct a new ideational framework in which it is the center of East Asia, with regional economies revolving around it. Because Beijing is aware that it’s economic heft and increasing military capabilities are a cause of concern for many of its neighbors, the CCP is attempting to advance the notion that it is strong and powerful but not tough (强势但不强硬).[15] For many foreign policy watchers in the United States, it seems like the CCD is a medium through which China seeks to become the central power in East Asia via economic and soft power means, backed up by hard power-- ultimately supplanting the United States in this role.

Although light on details, Chinese leaders claim the CCD will be “harmonious, open, and inclusive” in nature.[16] The plan emphasizes the growing interconnectedness of the region as well as the world, and the fact that the prosperity of the nations of East Asia is increasingly intertwined[17]. In Xi Jinping’s own words, “Mankind, now living in one global village... has become a community of shared destiny. Everyone has within themselves, a little bit of everyone else”.[18] While characterizing the U.S. and its allies as being captured by a Cold War mentality,[19] Beijing seeks to burnish its leadership credentials through multilateral organizations such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).[20] Chinese leadership uses these tactics to advance a narrative in which the U.S. is incessantly meddling in regional affairs, and that China offers a superior alternative in which Asia will be led by Asians. However, one must wonder whether or not Beijing is aware that its Community of Common Destiny sounds oddly similar to Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Asian leaders are probably skeptical about China’s intentions.

So why the CCD and why now? There are a number of factors that probably caused China to hasten the advancement of its regional vision. One important reason was the 2012 announcement of America’s “Pacific Pivot”, which gave Chinese leaders greater concern that the United States may try to contain China’s rise.[21] In addition, the inability of China to acquire greater voting power in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because of the intransigence of the U.S. Congress, the tradition of an American heading the World Bank, a Japanese leading the Asian Development Bank, and a European leading the IMF, all likely caused China to realize that the status quo powers were not willing to accommodate its rise as a major geopolitical actor.[22] As if to add insult to injury, President Barack Obama has openly stated that a key reason to support the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade is so that America could write the rules for trade in East Asia instead of China.[23] With these seemingly blatant attempts by the United States to maintain its strategic edge vis-à-vis China, Beijing likely concluded that if the current system wouldn’t open up for it, a new one would have to be built.

Although the CCD narrative is enshrouded in catch-words and lofty principles, there are numerous components of this vision that are cause for concern. To start, China’s current adversarial relations with Japan seem to leave this other major power out of China’s planned regional framework. If anything, Japan is viewed by the Chinese as an American stooge, propagating Washington’s strategic vision. However, true regional integration and cooperation cannot advance without the world’s third largest economy.

Another factor that will likely undermine China’s relations with its neighbors is Chinese activities in the South and East China Seas. In the former, China is rewriting the facts on the ground, using land reclamation techniques to create islands. It recently announced that it would continue construction on its Nansha (Spratly Archipelago) facilities, saying it would build “a moderate amount of defense facilities on some of the islands and reefs,” which would “have nothing to do with militarization”.[24] The irony of this statement will not be lost on regional leaders, especially since China recently deployed Surface-to-Air (SAM) missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels in February[25]. Unilateral actions such as these will likely frustrate China’s ambitions to gain the consent of regional nations to supplant the U.S. as East Asia’s predominant power.

Another issue that China must face is how a system such as the CCD can function in a region with as much political, cultural, and economic diversity as East Asia. This is one of the primary reasons that East Asia hasn’t already started moving towards regional integration. Another factor is cultural desire of many Asian nations to proceed very slowly down the path of regional integration, seeking consensus and proceeding cautiously.[26] According to American University’s Amitav Acharya, the ASEAN approach towards regional integration “…involves a high degree of discreetness, informality, pragmatism, expediency, consensus-building, and non-confrontational bargaining styles…”[27] This type of regional integration will likely stymie China’s efforts to quickly form a new regional order.

In a broad sense, there are two possible ways that the CCD could fundamentally alter the East Asian regional dynamic. The first possibility is that nations in the region will accept China’s hegemony. Such a system would likely see the exit of the United States as the rule and norm setter in the region, but wouldn’t necessarily preclude the U.S. from trade relations with regional nations. However, it is unlikely that China would allow Washington to maintain its strong military alliances with allies such as the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Since U.S. military dominance underwrites the security of many of the nations in East Asia, China would have to take over the role of security guarantor, thus creating a security community. However, Beijing would have to convince regional leaders that this will not be to the detriment of the independence of the nations in the region. Economically, China could use its excess construction capacity and foreign exchange reserves to fund massive infrastructure projects throughout the region via the AIIB, thus filling its own pockets while weaving its smaller neighbors into its One Belt One Road initiative. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would take over the role of guaranteeing free flow of trade (at least for the nations it has amicable relations with).

The second potential scenario that could result from China’s advancement of the CCD is that it could cause significant regional division. Nations that are friendly to Beijing and see their economic future tied to the Middle Kingdom may drift closer towards it, while nations that are wary of China’s intentions may drift towards what can be seen as the alternative: a network of Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. This does not necessarily mean there will be a solid division of the nations of East Asia into one camp or the other, as Europe was divided by the Iron Curtain during the Cold War. Instead, we will likely see countries align their defense and economic policies with the U.S.-led coalition, or with China. Another possibility is that the nations of East Asia will align their economic policies with China and their defense policies with the United States. An example of this is South Korea and Australia, both of whom are military allies of the U.S. but have China as their largest trading partner.  This could be a way for these nations to prosper economically through ties to China but also remain a part of the U.S. led security arrangement which supports free trade, open seas, and a rules based order—principles which a Chinese led regional security order might not include. Even if Chinese hegemony in East Asia were the best way forward for these nations, these governments would likely be more comfortable sticking to a U.S.-led system with which they are familiar versus choosing to a Chinese system which will bring change and uncertainty. However, it’s questionable how long a “split-order” could last with the U.S. and China vying for regional leadership. 

It would be incorrect to describe the current dynamic of power relations in East Asia as a cold war, but there is definitely a competition between the United States and China for regional leadership. While the “Pacific Rebalance” articulates America’s vision for the Far East, China believes its Community of Common Destiny will more successfully appeal to Asian leaders. Whether or not the CCD will be adopted by China’s neighbors is contingent upon what they believe Beijing’s intent is, and what they stand to gain from a Chinese-led regional order.

References
[1] Tiezzi, Shannon. 2014. “China’s Push for an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement.” The Diplomat, October 30. Accessed November 20, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/chinas-push-for-an-asia-pacific-free-trade-agreement/
[2] Kai, Jin. 2013. “Can China build a community of common destiny?” The Diplomat, November 28. Accessed November 20, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/can-china-build-a-community-of-common-destiny/
[3] Li, Zhihui. 2015. “Xi’s diplomacy: peaceful development in a community of common destiny.” Xinhua News Agency, September 11. Accessed November 20, 2015.  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/11/c_134615486.htm
[4] Braht, Philippa. 2015. “One belt, one road? China’s community of common destiny.” The Interpreter, March 31. Accessed November 20, 2015. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/31/One-belt-one-road-Chinas-community-of-common-destiny.aspx
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Tiezzi, 2014.
[9] 2015. “The Infrastructure Gap.” The Economist, March 21. Accessed November 20, 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21646740-development-finance-helps-china-win-friends-and-influence-american-allies-infrastructure-gap
[10] Ibid.
[11] 2015. “Xi’s trip to help build foundation for China-ASEAN community of common destiny.” China Daily, October 30. Accessed November 20, 2015. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-10/30/content_22328954.htm
[12] Ibid.
[13] Tiezzi, 2014.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Kai, 2013.
[16] Braht, 2015.
[17] Li, 2015.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Tiezzi, 2014.
[21] Kai, 2013.
[22] Economist, 2015.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Can, Yuan. 2015. “China to continue construction of naval facilities on Nansha islands.” People’s Daily, November 25. Accessed November 26, 2015. http://en.people.cn/n/2015/1125/c90000-8981708.html
[25] Hurst, Holmes, McCurry. 2016. “Beijing places missile launchers on disputed South China Sea island.” The Guardian, February 17. Accessed February 22, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/17/china-places-missiles-woody-south-china-sea-islands
[26] Acharya, Amitav. 1997. “Ideas, identity, and institution-building: from the ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific way’?” The Pacific Review Vol. 10 No. 3: 329.
[27] Ibid.

Peter Loftus is an International Relations Masters student at the Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.