China and the US: Towards a New Type of Major Power Relations

Source: Xinhua

Note: The views expressed in this piece are of the author's alone, and do not reflect the views of the US Air Force or the Department of Defense.

China’s role in the P5+1 negotiations with Iran demonstrate the potential for broader U.S.-China cooperation on mutual security issues

China and the United States have become competitors for influence in many areas across the world, and are already in a great power rivalry. Many scholars believe that this could escalate into a Thucydides Trap, in which the suspicion of the status quo power (the U.S.) towards the ascendant power (China) leads to outright conflict in an attempt to check the rising power. However, China’s role in the P5+1 talks with Iran run antithetical to this line of reasoning. The Chinese government’s efforts as a helpful mediator have demonstrated China’s ability to be a helpful contributor to a stable and secure world order while at the same time peacefully competing with the U.S. This article will begin with a summary and analysis of the role that China has played in these talks, followed by an analysis of how the United States and China can cooperate to provide a stable and prosperous new world order.


History of UN sanctions on Iran

The sanctions on Iran which have been under negotiation were passed by the UN Security Council over the course of several years. From July 2006 to September 2008, the Security Council passed resolutions 1696, 1737, 1803, and 1835, all of which incrementally increased sanctions against Iran[1]. These sanctions were expanded significantly in June of 2010 when the Council passed resolution 1929, banning the sales of military equipment to Iran, implementing targeted financial sanctions, and the freezing of assets of 55 Iranian companies among other measures[2]. The effect has been to place a crippling burden upon the Iranian economy. Although this is probably not the only factor that brought the Iranians to the negotiating table, it is likely a significant component.


China’s role in the negotiations

Beijing has historically had positive relations with Tehran. Since the beginning of Security Council sanctions in 2006, China has been a persistent advocate of sanctions relief for Iran[3]. However, China acknowledges that if Iran were to become a nuclear power, it would instigate instability in an already volatile region[4].

China served as a neutral arbitrator during the P5+1 negotiations, able to act in good faith to both sides because it was not intimately involved in the sanctions against Iran[5]. Former Chinese Ambassador to Iran Hua Liming commented upon this recently, noting that "When the two parties came across irresolvable problems, they would come to China, which would 'lubricate' the negotiation and put things back on track”[6]. Playing this neutral role, China was able to provide helpful suggestions at critical junctures[7]. For example, China has offered to become directly involved in dealing with the Arak heavy water reactor, which has been a sticking point for negotiations[8].

During the negotiations, it is believed that Beijing played an important role behind the scenes in one key additional area: Russia. Many times since the beginning of negotiations in 2013, Russia acted as a difficult partner, often making last second demands[9]. Many commentators have asserted that Russia, which has been weakened by sanctions from Western nations related to its actions in Ukraine, has become economically, strategically, and diplomatically more dependent upon China[10]. Russia is expected to be hurt by the influx of Iranian oil into the world market, which will likely lower the cost per barrel[11]. China, however, stands to benefit greatly from a lifting of sanctions against Tehran, as will be discussed later. The fact that Russia agreed to the nuclear agreement suggests some sort of behind-the-scenes action to appease Moscow. Many spectators believe that Beijing played a coercive role in forcing Moscow to operate in good faith[12].  


Sino-Iranian Relations: Economics

Beijing and Tehran have had a fairly baggage-free history, unlike the other powers involved in the negotiations. As mentioned before, China has functioned as a sort of benefactor, seeking to shield Iran from the heavier sanctions. In addition, the two nations had strong trade relations prior to the implementation of UN sanctions. Although China supplanted Europe as Iran’s largest trading partner in 2007[13], trade between the two nations was curtailed significantly following the implementation of the Security Council sanctions. From 2011 to 2012, Chinese investment in Iran dropped from $3 billion to $400 million, and trade dropped from $45 billion to $37 billion[14]. Before the sanctions, Iran was China’s third largest source of crude oil; it is currently the sixth[15]. However, the removal of sanctions promises a bright future for both nations. Both sides have pledged to double bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2016[16], and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has recently stated that he hopes Iran will be an important actor in China’s new “One Belt, One Road” initiative[17]. Iran thus far has been warm to this Chinese led plan, unlike many of its Arab neighbors[18]. According to an Iranian deputy minister, China has also promised to increase its infrastructure investment in Iran to $52 billion[19]. All of these signs are indicative of increasingly warm relations between Beijing and Tehran, with both sides expecting significant economic results. But to simply examine trade and investment ignores a key topic of one the world’s most volatile regions: security. 


Sino-Iranian Relations: Security

China and Iran have numerous overlapping security interests upon which they can cooperate. They are both revisionist powers that seek to alter the modus vivendi of global affairs[20], which has been led by the United States since the end of World War II. Iran also provides a strategic opportunity for China to establish a foothold in the region, since almost every other Gulf state is allied with the United States[21].   

As recently as October 2014, the Chief of the Iranian Navy met the head of the Chinese Navy and the Chinese Secretary of Defense[22]. Earlier that year Iran called for greater Chinese naval involvement in the region[23], and the meeting in October led to calls for greater interaction between the two nations’ navies through port calls and anti-terror cooperation[24]. This was accompanied by a port call by the Chinese Navy in Bandar Abbas in 2014-- a first of its kind[25].

A key component of China’s economic security is its oil imports. Currently, approximately 70-85% of its fossil fuel imports cross through the Straits of Malacca[26]. It is thought that China could construct a pipeline from Iran to China to further its energy security[27], which would add to several recent pipeline deals that China has signed with Myanmar, Kazakhstan, and Russia in attempt to avoid the Straits of Malacca and create a more diversified energy infrastructure[28].

China will not encourage Iran to engage in disruptive behavior, since the Chinese leadership has little interest in seeing further instability in an already volatile region. Beijing sees the Middle East as an important source of fossil fuels, as well as a potential source of turmoil and jihadist militants. It is likely that China will push Tehran to limit its support for organizations like Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Iran. China sees the turmoil in the Middle East as a threat to its economic interests in the region, and it is already fearful of its own domestic insurgency in Xinjiang. It is doubtful that the Ayatollah and his ruling clique will end their geopolitical contests with Sunni nations and their Western allies. Beijing desires greater stability in the Middle East, and if Beijing were to exert more influence over Iran, the Ayatollah may have more to gain from a peaceful foreign policy agenda. In this case, China can serve as a moderating force towards militant Iranian policies. 


Issues between Iran and China

Despite the seemingly sunny relations between Iran and China, there are in fact certain issues of contention. For example, Iranian manufacturers often complain of Chinese products undercutting locally produced goods—a common refrain from many Chinese partners[29]. In 2014, the government of Iran cancelled a $2.5 billion contract with the China National Petroleum Corporation, a Chinese state-owned enterprise[30] [31]. The contract was terminated because China failed to make progress in the Azadegan oilfield adequately after numerous appeals from Iran to proceed with development[32].

Another issue that could plague Sino-Iranian relations has to do with the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2014 China received 16% of its crude oil imports from Saudi Arabia--its largest source--and 9% from Iran[33]. As China further develops its relationship with Tehran, it risks alienating Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, the majority of whom are geopolitical rivals of Iran[34]. With greater involvement in the economics and politics of the region, China will begin to encounter the dense web of alliances and factionalism that makes the human terrain of the Middle East so difficult to navigate.


The Implications of the Iran Deal on U.S.-China Relations


With relations between Beijing and Tehran likely to improve, what does this say about China-U.S. relations, and China’s broader role in the world? Under Deng Xiaoping, China proclaimed a non-ideological foreign policy[35]. In “World Order”, Henry Kissinger says “Deng’s style was sharply focused: not to boast – lest foreign countries become disquieted – not to lead, but to extend China’s influence by modernizing both the society and economy”[36]. But this trend seems to have changed. According to Christopher K. Johnson, a senior adviser on China at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China under Xi Jinping is rejecting Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “hide and bide”[37]. China is now engaging in what President Xi has termed a “new type of major power relations” (新型大国关系)[38], which means China will have a much more active foreign policy agenda, especially in the areas around its periphery.

As the world’s sole remaining superpower, the United States has dashed near and far across the globe seeking to stamp out global security issues. Although the foreign policy actions of the U.S. are often tinged with ideological motives, such as the advancement of democracy and human rights, many nations recognize the necessity of U.S. military power to provide balance and security for the world at large. In many ways, the United States is the “off-shore balancer”, keeping regional power dynamics from becoming volatile[39]. This can be seen from the eastern flank of Europe, to the Demilitarized Zone on the Korean Peninsula, to Operation Inherent Resolve, which seeks to degrade and destroy the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

With the advent and swift progression of globalization, the nations of the world are becoming more and more inter-connected every day. Conflict in one region of the world can cause significant damage to global markets. The U.S. should welcome a China that is more engaged in maintaining a stable global order.

The battle against ISIL is an excellent case in point. As of July 15, the United States has spent $3.21 billion on the conflict, predominantly on air operations[40]. This adds up to approximately $9.4 million per day[41]. As of October 2014, 88.4% of these strikes had been carried out by the United States, with the rest being carried out by Gulf and European partners[42]. It would be of great benefit if a world power such as China were to carry additional weight in countering this global security threat.

Although many in the Washington political establishment see growing relations between Tehran and Beijing as a threat, American leaders must think strategically. U.S. policymakers acknowledge that both Beijing and Washington strongly desire stability in the Middle East and look for areas of potential cooperation. President Xi Jinping has demonstrated China’s willingness to play a larger role on the world stage, as has been evinced by the Chinese contributions to peacekeeping missions through the UN, anti-piracy operations around the Gulf of Aden, and contribution to the fight against Ebola in West Africa. China has even ventured into the Israel-Palestine dispute, as seen with Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s attendance at the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Symposium in 2013[43]. The United States must think strategically and consider how China can play a role in bringing all parties in the Middle East to the table for stability and economic development. A China that is more engaged in solving the issues of the Middle East should be welcomed, especially if it can help with an often intransigent Iran. The stronger Beijing’s relationship is with Tehran, the more able it will be to push Tehran towards productive habits, rather than stirring tensions in places like Bahrain, Lebanon, and Yemen. As a rogue state, Iran had little to lose in its regional competition with Arab states. But with carrots and sticks provided by the U.S. and China, together with the world community, we may see a de-escalation of tensions. 


China and Pakistan

This trend is already taking place elsewhere. With an insurgency thriving in Xinjiang, we can see Beijing pressuring nations in Central Asia to help in the fight against Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)[44]. Chinese influence in South and Central Asia can be of great use to the United States. Although the tribal regions of Pakistan are one of the key areas of conflict in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the United States has had fraught relations with Islamabad for many years. After stepping down as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen criticized Pakistan for “exporting” extremism to Afghanistan[45].  He said "in choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan – and most especially the Pakistani Army and Intelligence Service – jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership, but also Pakistan's opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence"[46].

In contrast, since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, relations between Islamabad and Beijing have been very close[47]. In a 2014 poll carried out by the Pew Research Center, 78% of Pakistanis had a positive view of China, with only 3% having a negative view. Of the 43 nations surveyed, no nation had a higher positive view of China, and no nation had a lower proportion interviewees with a negative view[48]. In addition to having extensive military cooperation with Pakistan, especially in the areas of missiles, nuclear technology, and aircraft[49], China and Pakistan enjoy very close economic relations as well. This can be seen from the $46 billion economic corridor recently agreed upon by the two nations, which will be a “flagship” project of President Xi’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative[50].


China and Afghanistan

The potential for broader strategic cooperation between the United States and China extends to Afghanistan as well. While the United States and its allies have sought to provide security and stability in Afghanistan, China has played a quiet role as a major investor in the strife-riven country. This is very important, since one of the required elements for a resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan is economic development.

China first showed signs of interest in the Afghan nation building project in 2013[51]. According to Franz-Michael Mellbin, a member of the European Union envoy to Afghanistan, the Chinese had “...been looking for an area to expand their foreign policy toolbox, but also doing it in a way that would not be seen as strategically threatening to the U.S.”[52]. If anything, Chinese participation in the development of the Afghan economy and security framework could be immensely helpful to Kabul. Since 2012, the United States and China have led a joint program designed to help train Afghan diplomats[53]. In addition, Beijing has pledged $327 million in aid to Afghanistan through to 2017[54]. Both China and the United States have a strong interest in a stable and peaceful Afghanistan, but Beijing brings some unique cards to the table. For example, it is said that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani seeks to gain assistance from Beijing to assure that China’s ally Pakistan doesn’t play an overbearing role towards its smaller Afghan neighbor[55]. 


China and Xinjiang

One of the prime reasons that China is so concerned with Afghanistan and Pakistan is that similar to ISIL controlled territory,  both countries have the potential to be breeding grounds for China’s own domestic insurgency in its northwest. On August 4th, Beijing even went so far as to request the assistance of the United States in combating the East Turkestan Independence Movement, which exists in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (ETIM)[56]. Some allege that this organization came into existence because of harsh restrictions on Islamic practices in Xinjiang[57]. For example, this year the Chinese government banned civil servants, teachers, and students from fasting during Ramadan[58]. It also discouraged the entering of mosques for religious activities, and mandated that if anyone does enter, their identification cards must be checked[59]. It is also possible that increasing insurgent activity in the predominantly Muslim region was the catalyst for the government’s restrictions on religious practices. Either way, such tactics are unlikely to counter any potential terror threats, and may even cause further anti-Beijing animosity amongst Uighurs towards the government in Beijing.

The recently released U.S. National Military Strategy white paper characterizes VEOs as a threat to national security as well as the international order[60]. In order to quell the spread of VEOs across the globe, the United States should use its experience from over a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan to show the Chinese government how to provide security while at the same time preserving religious freedoms. Both the United States and China have a strong interest to improve the situation in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. It is believed that over 300 Uighurs have joined ISIL in Iraq and Syria[61]. As recently as Monday, July 27, ISIL used one of its social media accounts to post a twelve minute video of a Uighur fighter appealing to fellow Uighurs to come to Iraq and Syria, wage Jihad, and pledge allegiance to the caliph[62]. It is very likely that such jihadists could return home to cause violence within China.

Towards a “New Type of Major Power Relations”

In the coming years, the United States and China will compete for economic and security influence across the world. But this does not preclude cooperation on economic and security issues. Instead of allowing global security threats such as ISIL to flourish, China and the United States have the opportunity to organize their efforts to provide a stable and peaceful world system. Beijing’s involvement in the Iran nuclear deal proves that through cooperation on security issues the United States and China can also learn how to accept one another’s presence on the world stage, rather than enter the spiralling competition that leads to a Thucydides Trap.

References

[1] Kelsey Davenport, “Iran Nuclear Proposals,” January 2014, accessed August 3, 2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals
[2] Ibid.
[3] Shannon Tiezzi, “What did China bring to the Iran Talks?” The Diplomat, July 23, 2015, accessed July 31, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-already-preparing-for-a-post-sanctions-iran/
[4] Ibid. 
[5] Ibid.
[6] Adrian Wan, “China plays key broker role in Iran deal,” South China Morning Post, 25 November 2013, accessed 30 July 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1364808/china-plays-key-role-broker-iran-nuclear-deal
[7] Shannon Tiezzi, “What did China bring to the Iran Talks?” The Diplomat, July 23, 2015, accessed July 31, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-already-preparing-for-a-post-sanctions-iran/
[8] Michelle FlorCruz, “Iran Nuclear Deal: China to Build 2 Plants For Islamic Republic Following Historic Agreement,” International Business Times, July 22, 2015, accessed July 30, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-nuclear-deal-china-build-2-plants-islamic-republic-following-landmark-agreement-2020102
[9] Pavel Baev, “The China factor in Russian support for the Iran deal,” The Brookings Institute, July 21, 2015, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/07/21-china-russia-support-for-iran-deal-baev
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Zachary Keck, “China’s Trade and Investment in Iran Plummets,” The Diplomat, March 22, 2013, accessed August 1, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/chinas-trade-and-investment-in-iran-plummets
[14] Ibid.
[15] Michael Singh, “The Sino-Iranian Tango,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango
[16] Zachary Keck, “China’s Trade and Investment in Iran Plummets,” The Diplomat, March 22, 2013, accessed August 1, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/chinas-trade-and-investment-in-iran-plummets/
[17] Michelle FlorCruz, “Iran Nuclear Deal: China to Build 2 Plants For Islamic Republic Following Historic Agreement,” International Business Times, July 22, 2015, accessed July 30, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/iran-nuclear-deal-china-build-2-plants-islamic-republic-following-landmark-agreement-2020102
[18] Michael Singh, “The Sino-Iranian Tango,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Shannon Tiezzi, “China Wants More Military Co-op with Iran,” October 24, 2014, accessed July 29, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/china-wants-more-military-co-op-with-iran-sorry-us-and-pakistan/
[23] Michael Singh, “The Sino-Iranian Tango,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango
[24] Shannon Tiezzi, “China Wants More Military Co-op with Iran,” October 24, 2014, accessed July 29, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/china-wants-more-military-co-op-with-iran-sorry-us-and-pakistan/
[25] Michael Singh, “The Sino-Iranian Tango,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango
[26] Daniel Brutlag, “China’s reliance on shipping crude oil through the Straits of Malacca,” May, 2011, accessed August 3, 2015, http://sites.tufts.edu/gis/files/2013/02/Brutlag_Daniel.pdf
[27] Michael Singh, “The Sino-Iranian Tango,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango
[28] Makato Igrashi, and Tokuhiko Saito, “New oil pipeline highlights China’s effort to strengthen energy security,” Asahi Shimbun, March 2, 2015, accessed July 27, 2015, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201503020001
[29] Zachary Keck, “China’s Trade and Investment in Iran Plummets,” The Diplomat, March 22, 2013, accessed August 1, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/chinas-trade-and-investment-in-iran-plummets/
[30] Ibid.
[31] Michael Singh, “The Sino-Iranian Tango,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango
[32] Ben Blanchard, “China aims to boost military relations with Iran,” Reuters, May 5, 2014, accessed July 28, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/05/us-china-iran-idUSBREA4407A20140505
[33] “China,” Energy Information Administration, last modified May 14, 2015, http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN
[34] Michael Singh, “The Sino-Iranian Tango,” Foreign Affairs, July 21, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-21/sino-iranian-tango
[35] Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin, 2014), 175-178.
[36] Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin, 2014), 227.
[37] Jane Perlez, “Leader Asserts China’s Growing Importance on Global Stage,” New York Times, November 30, 2014, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/01/world/asia/leader-asserts-chinas-growing-role-on-global-stage.html?_r=1
[38] David Lampton, “A New Type of Major-Power Relationship: Seeking a Durable Foundation for U.S.-China Tie,” National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2013, accessed August 4, 2015, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=650  
[39] John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2001), 42.  
[40] Edwin Mora, “Pentagon: Costs of War Against ISIS Already Exceeds $3 Billion,” Breitbart, July 29, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/07/29/pentagon-cost-of-war-against-isis-already-exceeds-3-billion/
[41] Ibid.
[42] “U.S. Dominates Military Campaign Against ISIS,” Al Arabiya, October 7, 2014, accessed August 2, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/07/U-S-Air-Force-dominates-campaign-against-ISIS.html
[43] “China Raises Five Point Peace Proposal on Settling Israel-Palestine Conflict,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Arab Republic of Egypt, accessed August 3, 2015, http://eg.china-embassy.org/eng/zxxx/t1181006.htm
[44]Michael Martina and Jeremy Laurence, “China Urges Central Asian Neighbors to Step Up Extremism Fight,” Reuters, September 13, 2014, accessed August 5, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/09/13/china-xinjiang-idINKBN0H802J20140913
[45]Robert Crilly, “Mike Mullen: Pakistan is ‘Exporting’ Terror,” Telegraph, September 22, 2011, accessed August 4, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8783139/Mike-Mullen-Pakistan-is-exporting-terror.html
[46] Robert Crilly, “Mike Mullen: Pakistan is ‘Exporting’ Terror,” Telegraph, September 22, 2011, accessed August 4, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8783139/Mike-Mullen-Pakistan-is-exporting-terror.html
[47] Jamal Afridi and Jayshree Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated July 6, 2010, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/p10070
[48] “China’s Image,” Pew Research Center, July 14 2014, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-2-chinas-image/
[49] Jamal Afridi and Jayshree Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated July 6, 2010, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-pakistan-relations/p10070
[50] Andrew Small, Paul J. Smith, Daniel S. Markey, and Christopher Tang, “A New Era for China and Pakistan?” China File, April 23, 2015, accessed August 2, 2015, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/new-era-china-and-pakistan.
[51] Jeremy Page and Nathan Hodge, “As U.S. Exits, China Takes On Afghanistan Role,”Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-u-s-exits-china-takes-on-afghanistan-role-1423539002
[52] Ibid.
[53] “China, U.S. Partner to Train Afghan Diplomats,” China Daily, October 21, 2014, accessed July 27, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-10/21/content_18776023.htm
[54] Jeremy Page, and Nathan Hodge, “As U.S. Exits, China Takes On Afghanistan Role,”Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-u-s-exits-china-takes-on-afghanistan-role-1423539002
[55] Ibid.
[56] Michael Martina, and Benjamin Blanchard, “China Appeals for U.S. Help to Fight Xinjiang Militants,” Reuters, August 4, 2015, accessed August 7, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/05/us-china-usa-security-idUSKCN0QA07O20150805
[57] Ibid.
[58] “China Bans Ramadan Fasting in Mainly Muslim Region,” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2015, accessed August 5, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/06/china-bans-ramadan-fasting-muslim-region-150618070016245.html
[59] Ibid.
[60] “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America – 2015,” Department of Defense, June 2015, accessed July 27, 2015, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf
[61] Jacob Steinblatt, and Amitt Weiss, “ISIS Calls on Muslim Uighurs to Join Its Fight,” Vocativ, July 28, 2015, accessed August 1, 2015, http://www.vocativ.com/news/215757/isis-calls-on-chinas-muslim-uighurs-to-join-its-fight/
[62] Ibid.

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Peter Loftus is an incoming International Relations Masters student at the Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.