Taiwan’s Political Transformation

By Angela Chang

Abstract

Utilizing the modernization theory and Samuel P. Huntington’s transformation theory, this paper argues that, although preconditions for democracy were present in Taiwan, they did not necessarily lead directly to democratization, but instead helped to liberalize the KMT. Contrary to the idealized vision of democratic forces defeating KMT one-party rule, the actual transition process was a conscious decision by the party elite to transform the party from a liberalized autocracy into a democracy. By initiating it from the top, the elites within the party were able to control the process in such a manner that renewed the KMT’s legitimacy and preserved it in a high level of power. As a one-party system, the KMT not only transformed the national government but also the party by default. The KMT ensured that should they one day be voted out of office, as exemplified in 2000, they would have the ability to be voted back in through the very channels they had created for themselves (Keating 2006, 143).

Introduction

In the global arena, Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is forever intertwined with China, or the People’s Republic of China; how- ever, Taiwan’s democratization has distinguished the island from the authoritarian mainland. Alongside Taiwan’s economic miracle, the world witnessed a political miracle, which lends support to the idea that economic and political developments are mutually reinforcing (Copper 1996, 50). In the 1980s, the seemingly stable and unchallengeable Kuomintang Party (KMT) gave way to a number of variable pressures which liberalized the party and led to the democratization of Taiwan. Some claim that Taiwan’s transition has been “one of the smoothest...among newly democratized countries” (Hood 1997, 10). Did the KMT’s unprecedented political openness simply reflect Taiwan’s modernization, or were there other contributing factors? Furthermore, why did the KMT decide to “transition” into a democracy in the late 80s and early 90s when it had claimed the status of a democratic party since founding? This paper adopts Joseph Schumpter’s minimalist definition of democracy – a procedural definition for free, fair, and competitive elections of governing officials. Taiwan is defined as a one-party system of the KMT between the time of its transition from a Japanese colony in the mid-40s to its transition into a democracy in the late 80s and early 90s. Utilizing the modernization theory and Samuel P. Huntington’s transformation theory, this paper presents the argument that although preconditions for democracy were present they did not necessarily lead directly to democratization, but in- stead helped to liberalize the KMT. Contrary to the idealized vision of a KMT defeat, the actual transition process was a conscious decision by the party elite to transform the party from a liberalized autocracy into a democracy.

Theoretical Arguments

This paper applies modernization theory to study preconditions before political transition in Taiwan and transformation theory to examine the process of transition itself. The modernization theory postulates that democracy is a consequence of a progression of socioeconomic changes, such as urbanization, industrialization, rising per capita income, education, mass communication, mobilization, and political incorporation, which ready society for the final step (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2; Przeworski et al 2000, 88- 9) However, socioeconomic growth does not guarantee democratization, as famously exemplified by Singapore, and can lead to more severe policies when the government sees its legitimacy irrevocably bounded to economic growth. As Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard argue in Political Change in Taiwan (1992), “The crucial political processes that constitute democratization are either not articulated or are assumed to follow a simple model of increasing demand for democratization eventually yielding its supply” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2). Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that socioeconomic change increased democratic pressures on the KMT which responded by gradually liberalizing the party, preparing it to assume democratization.

Taiwan’s democratization process is broken down by Samuel P. Huntington’s transformation theory, found in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Huntington’s exploration of the global ‘wave’ of democratization concludes that there is no single explanation or cause for democratization; the break- down of authoritarianism does not equal the emergence of democracy; and differences among authoritarian regimes shape the transition processes to a democratic regime. Of Huntington’s four transitions, Tai- wan is best explained through trans- formation, a top-down approach, where the elites within the authoritarian regime “take the lead and play the decisive role” to change into a democratic system (Huntington 1991, 124). Such a process, however, requires the support of either a well established military or economically successful regime, lending support to modernization influences (Hunting- ton 1991, 125).

Huntington differentiates five phases of transformation, four of which occur within the authoritarian regime (Huntington 1991, 127-41). In the first phase, reformers emerge within the authoritarian regime viewing the party’s liberalization as a desirable or necessary “way of defusing opposition to their regime without fully democratizing.” In the second phase, the reformers gain power over the conservatives within the party, and this often happens when a reformer succeeds the death of an authoritarian ruler. In the third phase, the liberal reformers realize their failure since a liberalized autocracy is an un- stable equilibrium that needs to move towards one of two directions. In the fourth phase, democratically oriented reformers succeed the liberal reformers but must now effectively counter conservative forces and establish its own legitimacy within the context of the old party. In the fifth and final phase, the democratic reformers must act quickly to begin negotiations now that they have gained power. The reformers and opposition must reach moderate agreements to ensure a successful transformation, but if the reformers are particularly adept, they will utilize their relation- ships to co-opt the opposition and guide the negotiations in their favor. While Taiwan’s opposition arguably played an active role in the transition, the strategic transformation was always carefully controlled by the KMT leadership.

Preconditions Lean Towards Liberalization

Many variables contribute to an authoritarian regime’s decision to shift its balance of power, but the most crucial are those affecting the regime’s legitimacy. As a one party system, the KMT’s rule was “legitimated” with its ideology, allow- ing it to achieve “a relatively high level of political institutionalization” (Huntington 1991, 110). Sun Yat-sen founded the KMT in 1912 according to San Min Chu I, or The Three Founding Principles, of nationalism, democracy, and livelihood (socialism). He believed that “Once China’s sovereignty had been established, the livelihood principle could be introduced which would develop the country economically and pave the way for the realization of democracy” (Hood 1997, 5). This period of tutelage was undefined, but democracy was understood to be the end goal; however, should the KMT achieve its goal of democracy, it would lose legitimacy, but its inability to effect change would also cause loss of legitimacy. When the KMT fled to Taiwan during the civil war, it brought a continental sized administration and constitution with “pro- visions for political representation, mass participation, democracy, and civil right...already written into [it]” (Copper 1996, 19). These provisions were canceled out in 1949 under Martial Law (Temporary Provisions) for the sake of security. The KMT relied heavily on the idea, or myth, that it was the rightful government of all China, and until then, any support for an independent Taiwan would be seen as “subversive” (Huntington 1991, 119). Taiwan would re- main under a KMT emergency dictatorship for the next four decades, for democracy and civil liberties are a luxury in the face of security.

Does the economy come first and then democracy, as Sun Yat-sen claimed, or vice-versa? It is generally agreed that a new democratic regime experiences greater stability if economic development precedes democratization. Taiwan’s economic miracle was realized under a KMT leadership striving to actualize its promise to develop economically and to win Taiwanese support, whom outnumbered the transplanted regime. A number of economic re- forms were initiated in the 50s and 60s which destroyed the old feudal land system and dispersed industrialization throughout the island. Due to these reforms, Taiwan experienced one of the highest growth rates in the world from the 60s to 80s, and its relatively equal income distribution eased pressures for democratization (Huntington 1991, 71). Nonetheless, economic growth has created independent sources of power, exemplified by the government’s decreasing control in Taiwan’s industrial production: 56% in 1952, 19% in 1972, and less than 10% in 1992 (Huntington 1991, Foreword x). Although economic factors are not the deciding factor in democratization, the likelihood of democratization increases once a country reaches a certain mid-level of income stability. The emergence of a strong middle class entailed many features “common to a modernizing capitalist society...[which] undermined the KMT’s institutional capacity for mobilization and control” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 8-10). Economic development was necessary for KMT legitimacy, but it also promoted democratization by changing the social structure and values of the populace and its interaction with the rest of the world.

Interestingly, the populace experienced local democratic participation during this period of KMT dictatorship. Economic reform dramatically affected rural politics, “bringing grassroots democracy to Taiwan” (Copper 1996, 4). The new middle class had the economic and intellectual clout to form civic associations and demand political rights.

In truth, Green Island Prison Camp quickly filled with political prisoners, but the KMT concurrently allowed the cultivation of a civil society contrary to the conditions of Martial Law (Keating 2006, 69). The KMT believed that local politics was “faction ridden and undemocratic” thus not a threatening factor, utilizing local elections to divert the public’s attention from a lack of national elections (Copper 1996, 182). Nonetheless, they turned out to be quite democratic and a good training ground in constitutionalism and democracy (Cooper 1996, 182). Furthermore, the efficiency of the local government satisfied the majority of the public with their level of political participation, believing, like Sun Yat-sen, that democracy must come slowly and in stages (Copper 1996, 182). This was important for the KMT, since “Delegates to the national elected bodies of government could not be chosen by the people of China, since most of China (the mainland) was controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Changing status quo would be tantamount to declaring a two-China policy” (Cop- per 1996, 182-183). Martial Law delayed meaningful national elections, but the KMT’s support of civil society fostered a political culture that would eventually challenge its appropriateness.

Despite the KMT’s control over Taiwan’s internal affairs, it could not control international relations as easily due to the tenuous China-Taiwan relationship. In 1973, Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations in favor of mainland China under the one-China policy. Even though the US withdrew official diplomatic relations, its continued support and security, in particular the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, allowed for the first competitive national elections in Taiwan (Copper 1996, 129). Furthermore, there is the often unmentioned subject of the Republic of China’s ability to tell allies “that it could privately live with a two China settlement, but did not want to let this policy known back in Taiwan” lest it lose its claim to legitimacy and dictatorship (Keating 2006, 59). Taiwan’s status as a top exporter compelled continuing relationships with the majority of the western countries. Its cosmopolitan culture was consequently not only penetrated by western commerce, but also cultural understanding of the capitalist-democratic relationship and the “international pressure to improve its human rights record and to put into practice the democratic rights in its constitution” (Copper 1996, 130). Within this context, the KMT could not deny such demands lest an impacted economic trade also influence its legitimacy with the people.

By the early 80s, the rules in Taiwan had changed. Although the KMT still dictated the actions of the government, its legitimacy was eroding under the pressures from civil society, a growing opposition (to be ex- plained below), international actors, and even from within the party itself. Taiwan’s political development model had always placed preconditions to democratization, including security and socioeconomic stability, but it had never refuted democracy. Now that it had achieved its desired levels, with few excuses left, could Taiwan resist democratization any longer? The preconditions which had served to delay the transition process had also served to familiarize the public with a certain level of western democratic culture. As the viability of an authoritarian regime is in large part a function of its society, the KMT government could no longer ignore the gap between ideology and practice (Huntington 1991, 64). However, full democratization would require “a fundamental transformation of the ruling party from an entity closely intertwined with the state apparatus to an independent political organization competing equally for electoral support” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2).

Taiwan's Democratic Transformation

How did the KMT react to the pressures for democratization? In its position as an authoritarian one-party system, the KMT could have cracked down and removed the internal pressures; however, that would have openly flaunted its own party ideology, destroyed its international relations, and left the problem unsolved. The other choice would be to modify its position within the party, even if that meant democratizing.

Emergence of Reformers

Reasons for the emergence of re- formers within an authoritarian party remain unclear, but reform is ultimately seen as a desired and necessary outcome. A growing and educated middle class was able to bring western organization and mobilization techniques to the opposition (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 10-11). Their demands centered upon the full implementation of the constitution and Sun Yat-sen’s principles, questioning the KMT’s martial law, the legitimacy and competency of the “Long Parliament” (frozen into the administration since 1949), and domestic society. The KMT showed initiative by reversing agricultural policy, subsidizing rural economies, and recruiting Taiwanese elite into the party and government, but it became increasingly “difficult for the ruling party to define the terms of political participation unilaterally” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 11-12). The older, more conservative party cadres were dying out, and the new Taiwanese recruits joined with the younger members of the KMT to form a more moderate faction within the party. Many scholars point to the Kaohsiung Incident on December 19, 1979 as a decisive moment in Taiwan’s democratization. The Human Rights Rally planned in Kaohsiung set the stage for both opposition and KMT to prove their point. For the opposition it drew attention to the KMT’s human rights abuses and for the KMT it proved the op- position’s threat as a communist force (Keating 2006, 21, 72). The bloody riot and ensuing trials drew domestic and international attention, forcing both sides to reassess towards moderate methods. Within the KMT, the younger reformers and the older conservatives reached an agreement to “gradually ‘normalize’...political process while maintaining various constraints on the activities of the opposition” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 13). The costs of maintain- ing power had become too high for the KMT and the party needed to reduce the risks of losing legitimacy and liberalize.

Acquiring Power

The KMT’s reaction in the Kaohsiung Incident largely reflected the influence of Chiang Ching-kuo who had assumed the presidency in 1978, shortly after the death of his father, longtime ruler Chiang Kai-shek. According to Huntington, “authoritarian rulers could seize the bull by the horns and take the lead in ending authoritarian rule and introducing a democratic system...but it almost always first required a change of leadership within the authoritarian system” (Huntington 1991, 57). When Chiang Ching-kuo assumed power during an increasingly tumultuous period, he had to respond to the momentous changes accordingly. Although he had proved himself as a loyal and able member of the KMT, he eventually came to understand that continuing the harsh authoritarian ways of his father would be “dangerous to KMT survival and harmful to both his and his father’s personal legacy” (Hood 1997, 84). Consequently, the KMT needed to accommodate political change now, and he proved that commitment with an anti-corruption drive and the “Taiwanization” of the party (Cop- per 1996, 78). After the Kaohsiung Incident, the emerging reformist leaders of the party “calculated that democracy was the key and that only competitive national elections would prove that democratization was in progress” (Cooper 1996, 183). Aside from the implications of electoral fallacy, elections are the “principal mechanism through which changes in the social structure that have been brought about by rapid industrialization are translated into a political force for weakening the entrenched authoritarian order and for pushing the democratization process forward” (Hu and Chu 1992, 177). Elections would prove especially meaningful for the KMT reformers by legitimizing their constitutional ideology and government.

Taiwan’s 1980 elections set prece- dence as the first competitive national elections. New election laws resulted from agreements between both sides, but ultimately stemming from the KMT, to allow independent candidates to organize and compete as an opposition party (Copper 1996, 80, 183). The fact that the KMT still performed remarkably well is proof of Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership and the party’s mass popular support (Cooper 1996, 80). However, in the mid-80s, the KMT suffered a brief “crisis of confidence” which renewed its commitment to reform. In March of 1986, Chiang appointed a special task force within a newer and young- er Central Standing Committee to design a plan that would “implement the KMT’s goal of constitutional democracy” (Clark 2000, 27-28). He ordered the task force to study mar- tial law, the ban on the formation of new parties, aging in the National assembly, and ways to improve local government (Copper 1996, 228). The “centrist path” ensured that the KMT could set the parameters for change and increase popular sup- port with its nonviolence. Chiang’s use of the constitution to determine succession furthered popular support by showing the extreme conservatives as unconstitutionally plotting for his seat. In the end, Chiang’s skillful political maneuvering could not maintain the balance of a liberalized autocracy for the KMT, and a decision needed to be made.

F ailure of Liberalization

According to Huntington, liberal reformers retain power only briefly, since they are caught between the desire to change and to preserve, and “a liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand” (Huntington 1991, 134-137). Chiang’s actions reflected that of a dying man, who in his last years orchestrated a number of reforms which seemingly decreased the KMT’s monopoly but overall ensured that his successor could carry on the democratization process without accidentally losing the party’s legitimacy and power. The Central Standing Committee’s special task force proposed that political parties could legally form given that three conditions:

1) to abide by the constitution 2) to renounce communism 3) to deny supporting independence (Copper 1996, 230). The opposition was determined to not be seen “cooperating” with the KMT resulting in the early, but illegal, formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on September 28, 1986, for as Chu Kao-cheng, the leader of the motion, said “if we are going to be hung for a sheep, we might as well be hung for a cow” (Keating 2006, 74). Chiang could have crushed this illegal party, but he accepted the DPP as a contestant in the upcoming elections and evaded the potential charges of subversion under martial law by announcing its imminent termination (Huntington 1991, Foreword xi). In reality, Chiang had no alternative option, since blocking the DPP would have sent the wrong signals to all the observers. Consequently, the 1986 National Election was another watershed moment in Taiwan’s history, marking the first two party election in a Chinese nation. According to some political observers, this was “proof that the Republic of China had made the transition from an authoritarian political system to a democracy” (Copper 1996, 225). Regardless of whether or not this was the definitive action, the election served to advance the political modernization of both the KMT and the Taiwanese government.

The fact that the KMT still remained in power after the elections demonstrated that liberalization of the one-party system would not lead to its demise. Further proof of the “failure of liberalization” came with the official ending of martial law on July 15, 1987 after nearly four decades of emergency rule. With the constitution in full effect, the KMT no longer had authoritarian control to detain democratization. Martial law had affected the legal system, allowed military influence in national politics, and served as a psychological deterrent to democratization (Cop- per 1996, 97). Nonetheless, it is important to remember that political development had occurred before the abolition of martial law, and this was just one of the many steps taken by the KMT to alter the domestic and international perceptions of the party and government. With Chiang’s death in 1988, the power passed on to his Vice-President, Lee Teng-hui, a respected and well educated native born Taiwanese who had been groomed for the presidency. Lee “accepted the inevitability of democracy” and rose as the leader of the moderate faction, changing the image and views of the KMT dramatically and smoothing its path into democracy (Hood 142, Clark 47).

Backward Legitimacy

During a transformation, the reform leaders within the party often experience a “two steps forward, one step backward” progression as it struggles to counter opposing forces within, often requiring a “concentration of power in the reform chief executive” (Huntington 1991, 137). Lee Teng-hui was officially elected chairman of the party at the KMT’s 13th Party Congress in July 1988, signaling the transfer of power from a native-born Chinese to a native-born Taiwanese (Copper 1996, 135-6). Within the party, a triple alliance formed between moderate and conservative forces, with Lee Teng-hui as President, Lee Huan as Premier, and Hau Pei-tsun as Chief of General Staff (Leng 1996, 22). The Party Congress also agreed upon new rules and policies which enhanced the overall cohesiveness of the party and boosted their morale, and this sentiment was carried through the 1989 elections where the DPP did well enough to be considered a win but not a serious challenge to the KMT (Copper 152, 184). However, in early 1990, senior National Assembly members (“Long Parliament”) meeting to elect a new president took the opportunity to increase its own salary and privileges, sparking a public protest that served as a “necessary catalyst for Lee’s reforms” (Leng 1996, 27). The resulting National Affairs Conference in 1990 was an “unprecedented forum” between party and opposition elites that “[broke] the gridlock” and set a timetable for constitutional reform (Clark 2000, 27-9). Most notable was the decision to remove senior members of the national parliament. 1990 also witnessed the split of the KMT. An anti-Lee, conservative alliance headed by Lee Huan challenged Lee’s legitimacy, but Lee was able to manipulate the conflicts within this mainlander alliance by exposing them to public attack and utilizing his status as a native Taiwanese to mobilize support (Leng 1996, 24). Although the split diminished the overall size of the party, and aired internal conflicts to the public, Lee was able to then build a much stronger and cohesive party without resorting to violence. Huntington claims that during backward legitimacy the party “legitimate[s] the new order because it was a product of the old, and it retrospectively legitimate[s] the old order because it ha[s] produced the new.” (Hunting- ton 1991, 138) Thus, throughout the various events, the KMT was able to maintain legitimacy by appeal- ing to Sun Yatsen’s three principles while also setting itself apart as a new, moderate party representing the interests of the Taiwanese.

Coopting the Opposition

Once Lee Teng-hui emerged victo- rious from this period of backward legitimacy, he worked quickly to begin the final processes of democ- ratization, reaching agreements between all viable groups. More- over, as the reformers increasingly “alienated” the remaining conserva- tives within the KMT, they had to “reinforce themselves by developing support within the opposition and by expanding the political arena” (Huntington 1991, 139). According to John F. Copper, many in Taiwan assumed the superiority of a US modeled two-party system, and the KMT “demanded party competition because it associated it with democracy” (Cooper 1996, 369). The rapid strengthening of the opposition in 80s allowed for the growth of a true competitive democracy. While the organized political opposition gained greater status and legitimacy through elections, it is important to remember that these elections, and the formation of the opposi- tion party themselves, were carefully controlled by the KMT. The KMT had the advantage of setting limits on the debate by committing to the ultimate goal without further defin- ing its commitment and by tying the transition to already scheduled events (Chen and Haggard 1992, 16-17). The opposition on the other hand was able to specify alternative transition paths by raising the “cost of doing nothing,” but in reducing the risk of outpacing public opinion it had to further confine itself within the parameters of the “benign nature of KMT rule and prosperity” (Chen and Haggard 1992, 17).

Once the KMT allowed the opposition into the political arena, it had to take responsibility for the types of permissible negotiation. The National Affairs Conference in 1990 provided grounds for such negotiation over the method to select a president, with the KMT supporting an indirect election and the DPP a direct election (Leng 1996, 29). Al- though Lee Teng-hui submitted to the DPP’s pressure, its willingness to submit served to ally the moderates within the KMT with moderates at large, furthering its general support base and distinguishing the moderates from the conservative faction. With both the opposition and the public on his side, Lee was able to “buy time” before having to finally decide on the issue of popular elections for the presidency and vice presidency. The 1991 and 1992 National Assembly elections oversaw the “stepping down” of senior members of the “Long Parliament” and a full election of all members which silenced criticism over its unrepresentative, and thus undemocratic, nature (Cooper 1996, 184). Consequently, when Lee faced further challenge within by Hau Pei-tsun’s unconstitutional actions to interfere with the powers of the presidency, Lee could ally with the DPP against a common enemy to force Hau’s resignation and minimalize the remaining conservatives (Leng 1996, 31).

The KMT’s 14th Party Congress in 1993 served as a critical moment to match the democratization within the governmental system with the KMT’s own party structure, officially making Taiwan into the “democratic, pluralized society” it had evolved into (Copper 1996, 161). The final transfer of national leadership from the conservatives to the moderates also served as the final consolidation of Lee’s power. Constitutional revisions in 1994 provided for both the direct election of the president and the reduction of the premier’s endorsement power, perhaps as a reflection of the factional difficulties Lee had faced with his two premiers (Leng 1996, 32). The ensuing governor and mayoral elections served as a training ground for the legislative elections of 1995 and presidential elections of 1996. The tense competitive electoral atmosphere fully tested the national democratic system, since the candidates had to campaign at the national level, and it was “bigger and more complicated in many ways than most national elections” (Copper 1996, 343). Political democratization had come, and even if it had not always been a linear progression, the skillful reformers within the KMT had always kept it under control, finalizing it with the co-option of the opposition.

Consolidation

In March of 1996, Lee Teng-hui became the first president elected by popular election. Although many felt that this election cemented Taiwan’s track of democratization, others felt that democratization would not be complete until the KMT lost the power of the presidency. Tse Kang- leng makes the distinction between liberalization and democratization with “the latter [as] an ‘institutionalized’ liberalization” (Leng 1996, 19-20). Liberalizations were institutionalized with constitutional reforms. The last major constitutional change in 1996 occurred at the National Development Conference, where the powers of the President were increased with a corresponding decrease in the provincial government (Clark 2000, 31). This also reflected a remarkable confidence by the KMT in both the powers of democracy and the party itself. Sub- sequent elections would demonstrate the strength of the democratic process, but the KMT’s decades long monopoly would come to an end in 2000 with the presidential election of Chen Shui-bian from the DPP. The peaceful transition of 2000 and the subsequent 2004 reelection of Chen would prove that democracy had come and Taiwan’s voters were increasingly sophisticated in their approach by focusing on the issues of economy, localization, and respect (Keating 2006, 90). Although the actual transition process for Taiwan’s political transformation occurred within roughly the span of a decade, it would not have been possible to comprehend without looking at its overall political development. The very preconditions that the KMT had set to maintain an authoritarian hold over the island ultimately resulted in the liberalization of the party. Following Sun Yat-sen’s ideology, the KMT’s economic reform led to the modernization of society, sponsoring the many changes which allowed for a democratic transition. When the party realized that the inevitable could no longer be delayed, it decided that it would preempt the opposition but taking charge of the process. By initiating it from the top, the elites within the party were able to control the process in such a manner that renewed its legitimacy and preserved it in a high level of power. As a one-party system, the KMT not only transformed the national government but also the party by default. Democracy is the antithesis of absolute control, but the KMT ensured that should they one day be voted out of office, as exemplified in 2000, they would have the ability to be voted back in through the very channels they had created for them- selves (Keating 2006, 143). Thus, Taiwan has achieved the minimalist definition of democracy, with free, fair, and competitive elections, voting one party out in favor of another. What lies ahead for this “political miracle” are the societal problems which may serve to break down democracy, but Taiwan may proceed with the assurance that formal democratization, however imperfect, has been achieved.

References

1. Cheng, Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard. “Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoreti- cal and Comparative Perspectives.” Political Change in Taiwan. Ed. Tu-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

2. Clark, Cal. “Major Developments in Tai- wan’s Democratization.” Taiwan and Mainland China: Democratization, Political Participation and Economic Development in the 1990s. Ed. Thomas J. Bellows. New York: Center of Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 2000.

3. Copper, John F. The Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elec- tions and Foreign Relations. Lanham: UP of America, 1996.

4. Hu, Fu and Yun-Han Chu. “Electoral Competition and Political Democratization.” Political Change in Taiwan. Eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

5. Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: De- mocratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: U of OK Press, 1991.

6. “Foreword.” Political Change in Taiwan. Ed. Tu-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

7. Hood, Steven J. The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan. Boulder: West- view Press, 1997.

8. Keating, Jerome F. Taiwan: The Struggles of a Democracy. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 2006.

9. Leng, Tse-Kang. The Taiwan-China Con- nection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan Straits. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

10. Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. Democracy and Development: Political Institu- tions and Well-Being in the World, 1950- 1990. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000.