THE EMERGENCE OF A SUPERPOWER: CHINA'S UN POLICIES FROM 1971 TO PRESENT    

BY Della Fok
Abstract: As China has grown more confident in its role in the international sphere through the years, it has become more assertive in pursuing its strategic and foreign policy goals as evidenced by its performance in the UN over time. Like all states, China has sought to use the United Nations as a forum for projecting its foreign policy, and its objectives can be thematically categorized as (1) advancing its reputation in the international community, (2) enhancing its national security, and (3) seeking solidarity with the developing world so as to avoid isolation in the international community. The underlying motivation for this change has been China’s desire to be seen as a partner, global stakeholder, and eventual leader in the UN and international community. Through an examination of its use of abstentions and vetoes, discussion of how these reflect China’s overall strategy, and a case study analysis of China’s involvement with the issue of Sudan, this article analyzes how China’s role in the UN has changed from that of a passive one to an active one.

In today’s increasingly globalized world, China’s role as an international superpower is a topic of constant discussion as the country continues to define itself within the complicated realities of current geopolitical structures. In addition to its growing importance in the global economy, China’s identity as a superpower is rooted in its increasing political power in the world theater. Although the exact advent of China as a global political force is debatable, its potential power on a global scale certainly came to the fore in 1971 when the People Republic of China’s assumed China’s seat in the United Nations. Since then, China’s role in the UN has changed from that of a passive one to an active one, and I will argue that as China has grown more confident in its role in the international sphere throughout the years, it has become more assertive in pursuing its strategic and foreign policy goals, as evidenced by its performance in the UN. Like all states, China has sought to use the United Nations as a forum for projecting its foreign policy and achieving its national interests. This was especially apparent in its early years, during which time China’s objectives were (1) to advance its reputation in the international community, (2) to enhance its national security, and (3) to seek solidarity with the developing world so as to avoid isolation in the international community. These three themes have been consistent throughout China’s track record in the UN and have continued to mark its involvement and performance in the UN up to the present day, though with notable changes from a passive to a more active approach. The underlying motivation for this change has been China’s desire to be seen as a leader in the UN and the international community.

Historical Overview
An understanding of the context of Beijing’s complex entrance into the UN is necessary before analyzing China’s participation in the United Nations. In 1945 during the founding of the UN, China was one of the five permanent members of the Security Council after it ratified the Charter alongside France, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At this time, China was governed by Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government as the Republic of China (ROC). However, shortly after the Chinese Civil War was won by Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded, and Chiang’s Nationalist government was forced to retreat to Taiwan. Since “China” itself was an original Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, the question was not one of admission, but one of deciding which “China” – Taipei’s Republic of China or Beijing’s People’s Republic of China – would represent China in the UN. The two parties’ simultaneous claims to China’s UN seat defined the 22-year representation issues that marked China’s first phase of UN involvement.

From 1949 until 1971, the issue of representation was at the center of the PRC’s UN agenda. The legal status of China’s UN representation by the Nationalist delegation was first questioned in 1949, when the PRC assumed control of the Mainland and the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China sent a letter to the President of the General Assembly. This challenge was then supported by the Soviet Union’s representative to the Security Council who also challenged the Nationalist government’s claim to represent the Chinese people. China’s contested representation from 1949 to 1971 can be understood as three stages. First, there were substantive discussions in 1950, during which the General Assembly and the Security Council dealt directly with specific reference to the China participation and recognition issue. From 1951 to 1960, known as the moratorium period, the General Assembly, under the influence of the U.S. and its allies, postponed consideration of the China question by rejecting proposals to include the discussion onto the official agenda. Using these procedural maneuvers, the U.S. led a campaign to block the PRC’s UN recognition as part of its menu of items used to contain Chinese Communism expansionism. Substantive discussion then began in 1961 when China’s case was first included in the official agenda. The question was then considered and debated, with U.S.-backed Taipei slowly losing ground to Beijing over the 10 years until 1971 when Beijing was recognized and Taipei removed as China’s representative in the UN. Because this resolution was on an issue of credentials rather than one of membership, it was possible to bypass the Security Council where the United States and the ROC could have used their vetoes. From 1950 to 1955, the Soviet Union was China’s most active supporter due to the two countries’ Communist connections, and from 1955 until the Sino-Indian border conflicts of 1960, India was also China’s advocate. However, as Sino-Soviet relations worsened over the course of the 1950s and further deteriorated in the 1960s, Albania and Cambodia introduced draft legislation on China’s behalf in 1965, and in 1966, eleven countries submitted a proposal to seat the PRC: Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Pakistan, Romania, and Syria.

The eventual seating of Beijing in 1971, marked the first major defeat of the U.S. in the General Assembly and also signified the emergence of developing countries with China emerging as the “self-appointed champion of the new actions initiated by the Third World”. The turning point occurred on October 25, 1971, ten years after General Assembly discussion began on the China question. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 passed with 76 votes in favor, 35 against, and 17 abstentions, and declared “that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.” The PRC, with the support of the newly-recognized developing countries in the General Assembly, was finally granted China’s seat in the UN, and Beijing would not forget these roots.

Analysis of Abstention Strategy
China’s track record of abstentions has led many to describe China’s UN participation as that of a “non-participant” policy. China’s non-participation and use of abstentions stems from a historical ideological aversion to interfering in the domestic affairs of countries or undermining their sovereignty and territorial integrity in addition to its own aversion to taking a firm stand on issues. Since Beijing’s ascension to the UN in 1971, China has used its veto power very sparingly, instead opting for non-participation in voting in the 1970s and abstentions in the 1980s. Although it no longer employs a strategy of passive non-participation and has a much more active role in UN activity as compared to its early years, Beijing still retains abstentions as a key part of its UN strategy. By abstaining, Beijing has been able to send a message and yet avoid the necessity of taking sides and alienating allies.

China’s justifications for its non-participation and abstentions have remained fairly consistent over time. As mentioned earlier, China considers sovereignty and territorial integrity to be its banner issues and dislikes interfering in what it considers to be the domestic affairs of other countries. Beijing has been particularly sensitive to sanctions and use of force under the UN name, particularly when its own interests are at stake. However, because it does not want to be labeled as an obstructionist or stand in opposition to the West – particularly the United States and its allies – Beijing has never voted against the imposition of sanctions or the use of force.

During the 1970s, China created and consistently used a policy of non-participation in the Security Council voting process. Of the 101 resolutions adopted by the Security Council between November 24, 1971 and December 22, 1976, China posted a 39 percent rate of abstention and non-participation. Beijing was especially apprehensive about the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations, and opposed such actions for ideological reasons. First, China viewed such UN peacekeeping as a means for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to play out their power struggle, and Beijing disagreed with both Washington and Moscow. Second, state sovereignty and non-intervention were of utmost importance to China, especially in light of its own domestic situation with the continued Taiwan problem. This commitment to non-intervention is seen in China’s track record throughout the years, but especially during its first few years in the UN, ideological issues played a major role in Beijing’s avoidance of UN participation.

Another factor for China’s passivity during then 1970s was its relationship with the developing world. Beijing was aware of the support it received from developing nations during its 21-year struggle to claim China’s UN seat prior to 1971. To the PRC, this proved that its efforts in supporting decolonization had paid off politically. As the only developing country on the Permanent-Five Security Council, China felt that it had both a responsibility and an advantage in protecting the interests of developing nations. In 1974, Mao Zedong outlined the “Three-World Theory” and Deng Xiaoping, who was Vice Premier at the time, further outlined this theory at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly of that same year. As succinctly noted by Yeshi Choedon, “China identified itself with the Third World.” As such, China had an additional interest in using sovereignty and non-intervention as reasons for sitting out on UN activity.

However, despite this aversion to UN activity and participation, China’s inactivity did not translate to vetoes against peacekeeping operations. In response to the U.S. and Soviet Union’s power struggle, China did not want to appear to take sides and was unwilling to take its commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention to a level where its newly-recognized international reputation would be put on the line and on the record. Perhaps even more importantly, China did not want to appear obstructionist to either Washington or Moscow, or even relevant Third World countries who had interest in seeing such resolutions pass. As a result, China started its practice of non-participation: being present during the Security Council voting process but not voting. Thus, Beijing chose not to participate in or was absent from the vote on almost every UN peacekeeping operation during the 1970s.

This attitude changed with the adjustment of China’s foreign policy in the early 1980s, and China began participating in UNSC voting. Though most votes were actually abstentions, this was still a move towards a more participatory approach. During this period, China’s increased interactions on both bilateral and multilateral levels, particularly its newly normalized relations with the U.S. as marked by President Richard Nixon’s 1979 visit to China, helped Beijing to realize the importance and potential of the UN as a platform to slowly increase its activity and presence in the international community. Also during this time, Deng Xiaoping began rolling out his Reform and Opening Up policies. New leadership gave higher credence to engaging in international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy. This new international and domestic environment caused Beijing to re-evaluate its approach to the UN and led to its adjusted voting behavior in the 1980’s. However, China’s concern for sovereignty and non-intervention still ranked high among its issues with UN involvement, and China maintained a rather passive approach in the 1980’s.

Up to this point, China’s position in the UN was one of consistent passivity, frequently abstaining from resolutions that would interfere with what it considered a country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But starting in the late 1980s into the 1990s, China began to take steps toward more active participation in UN activities, particularly peacekeeping. Between 1988 and 1998, 36 UNPKO were established, and China voted in favor of all missions that carried out traditional peacekeeping tasks and those that were continuations of traditional missions established during the Cold War era. However, it still chose to abstain from new peace enforcement missions with the exception of voting in favor of the United Nations Operations in Somalia II.

Between 1990 and 1999 China abstained 41 times when contentious issues, like the use of force, humanitarian intervention, and the establishment of international criminal tribunals, were at the negotiating table. Between 1992 and 1996, China voted in favor of a resolution authorizing the use of force seven times and abstained seven times. China maintained its commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention concerns, but allowed itself flexibility to make decisions dependent on the situation at hand. This can be seen in two of its decisions during the 1990s – Iraq and Cambodia. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to Resolution 678, the UNSC’s first peace enforcement action. Beijing disagreed with Iraq’s invasion, but did not want to vote for a U.S.-led coalition attack due to its historical apprehensions about use of force. However, this occurred on the tails of the PRC’s near-universal condemnation for the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, and Beijing was anxious to regain its reputation and credibility within the international community. Thus, China relied on its tried and true tactic of abstention to allow the vote to past, and its cooperation with the West – or at least its lack of obstruction to U.S. leadership – was viewed favorably, thus putting Beijing back on track to be seen as part of the international community.

Cambodia in 1991 was an easier decision for China. In the aftermath of decades of civil war in Cambodia, China joined the rest of the Security Council’s vote for Resolution 745. This established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN’s first mission that involved taking over the administration of an independent state, organizing and running elections and overseeing human rights at a national level. China was eager to improve its international image and viewed Cambodia as a relatively straightforward and safe mission that Beijing felt comfortable supporting along its foreign policy goals of increased engagement with its Asian neighbors. As such, China sent 800 PLA engineering troops to UNTAC, marking the first time it contributed military troops for a UNPKO. Over the course of the decade, China also sent 437 military observers on five peacekeeping operations.

Thus, we see the beginnings of a flexible policy where Beijing has been more willing to change its historical policy of abstention and act in cooperation with other UNSC members based on both the particular situation and the stakes China itself stands to gain or lose from the international community.

Analysis of Veto Strategy
Despite these cautious steps towards activism, China is still sensitive to precedents that international peacekeeping could set for its domestic situation. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, use of force, and intervention remain key points of concern for China. In order for Beijing to support any form of international intervention, three requirements must be in place: there must be UN authorization, the resolution must “respect sovereignty,” and action must be at the invitation of the target state. When China feels that such conditions are not met and does not want to support such a measure, its two options are to abstain or veto. China often chooses to abstain when it does not want to take a stand and when it disagrees with the policy – for example, Iraq in 1990 – yet does not want to go against countries such as the U.S. who wish to see the resolution through.

The second option – the veto – is much more rarely used by China, having occurred only six times since Beijing assumed China’s UN seat in 1971. China will veto a resolution only if it disagrees strongly enough to take a firm stand against other members of the Permanent-Five and stop the resolution from passing. Otherwise, Beijing usually expresses its disapproval via abstention. These six vetoes can be loosely categorized into: (1) vetoes directly related to its own national sovereignty, most notably issues related to the recognition of Taiwan; and (2) vetoes alongside the former Soviet Union and its successor state Russia, most notably on issues of sovereignty and intervention.

Of the six resolutions Beijing has vetoed, only three have been resolutions on which China was the sole veto, meaning that China’s active negative vote effectively prevented the resolution from passing. The other three would have failed regardless of China’s veto since the Soviet Union / Russia also vetoed the measure. Beijing’s first veto came in 1972, one year after its inclusion into the UN system. China vetoed the admission of Bangladesh into the UN because it had an alliance with Pakistan, from which Bangladesh sought independence. This vote is unique in China’s voting record, as the veto was not even in China’s own interest, but Pakistan’s. The fact that China allowed the resolution to pass two years later when the Bangladesh’s admission came to a vote again shows that China was uncomfortable with Bangladesh being denied admission solely because of Beijing’s veto, which did not even represent its own interests. From then on, Beijing was much more careful in deciding how to use its veto and even its vote. This experience evolved into the strategies of nonvoting and abstention we observed earlier. This more passive approach was one China was much more comfortable with, since it allowed the Chinese to send a message but avoided the necessity of alienating allies, taking sides, and assuming responsibility.

China’s other two deciding vetoes were regarding the ceasefire in Guatemala in 1997 and the extension of UN observers to Macedonia in 1999, both of which were vetoed because of the two countries’ recognition of Taiwan, which China considers to be a nonnegotiable threat to its own sovereignty. After China’s veto against Guatemala on January 10, it lifted its veto ten days later to allow peacekeeping troops into Guatemala after bilateral discussions that resulted in “a settlement to the dispute with Guatemala that had led to the veto.” In other words, Guatemala discontinued its diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and the Macedonia situation in 1997 played out similarly.

With the exception of its uncharacteristic veto in its second year of UN participation, these two vetoes mark the only times in Beijing’s 40 year history at the UN where it has been the determining negative vote that prevented a Security Council resolution from passing, and Beijing reasoning was clear – recognition of Taiwan, which Beijing views as an affront to its sovereignty. Beijing’s historical record shows that it unlikely China will disagree with an issue so strongly as to block its passing by veto unless the country in question recognizes Taiwan. As such, we can conclude that the issue of Taiwan is the only issue for China which is nonnegotiable.

China’s three other vetoes – regarding the Middle East in 1973, Myanmar in 2007, and Zimbabwe in 2008 – have all been alongside vetoes by the Soviet Union or its successor state Russia. In other words, these resolutions would have failed irrespective of China’s additional veto, so why was Beijing willing to take a firm stand on these three issues in particular, unlike the other resolutions it abstained from despite also disagreeing? Unfortunately, except for the commonality of a double veto with Russia, there is not a straightforward rule on such situations unlike those concerning Taiwan. However, we can still observe where China broke with its usual trend in these three situations.

In 1973 China voted with the Soviet Union against the ceasefire in the Middle East. Since the Yom Kippur War was during the Cold War, the U.S. was seen as the backer of Israel while the U.S.S.R. was considered the ally of the Arab states. China’s veto alongside the Soviet Union in 1973 was an aberration from its many Cold War-era abstentions, which reflected its desire to align itself neither superpower. As such, it is more difficult to pinpoint China’s rationale for its veto on the Yom Kippur War. China’s historical ties with the Soviet Union most likely played a role in its decision, though it is less clear why China gave a firm veto on this issue whereas it abstained from vetoing alongside the Soviet Union in many other issues during this era.

China’s rationales for its vetoes alongside Russia in the 2000s are more easily analyzed. In 2007, Beijing vetoed with Russia against criticizing Myanmar on human rights. China is particularly sensitive to criticisms on its own human rights record, which it sees as a domestic issue to be handled internally, not subject to international commentary. Clearly, it had a national interest to protect itself by vetoing the resolution, less China become the next target of such criticisms. In addition, because Russia was also going to veto the resolution, the political costs were significantly lowered since China would not have to singly bear the burden of being the reason for the resolution’s rejection.

China’s most recent veto was in 2008 against sanctions on Zimbabwe. Several factors distinguish it from other cases in which China expressed concerns about intervention, but did not feel strongly enough about to go beyond abstention and actually veto the resolution. First, Beijing was most likely willing to take a strong stance on nonintervention in Zimbabwe because it would be a sign of solidarity with the developing world, particularly one in Africa. China’s policy on nonintervention reflects its belief that a country should solve its own problems – and have the option of defining such problems itself – instead of having outside sources such as the UN, which China and the developing world often view as a proxy for the West, impose its values via sanctions and force. This policy of nonintervention protects China against possible future intrusions on its own domestic situation and builds solidarity with the developing world, as seen in this veto against Zimbabwean sanction.

A second reason the Chinese were perhaps willing to veto on Zimbabwe’s behalf in 2008 was Beijing’s relationship with Zimbabwe specifically and its hopes for future relations with Africa generally. In 2006, China signed a $1.3 billion energy deal with Zimbabwe that would provide the African country with coal mines and thermal power stations from Chinese companies. In addition to trade opportunities, Zimbabwe provided chrome. One commentator described it as: “For Harare, an international pariah, China represents its only major international supporter...” While China did not explicitly state its relationship with Zimbabwe alongside calls for nonintervention in defending its veto, it is doubtful China did not take such matters into consideration when deciding to veto measures against sanctions on Zimbabwe. Thus, the most logical conclusion for why China chose to go one step forward beyond its usual stance of abstention was because of existing bilateral ties with Zimbabwe and hopes for future ties with Africa and other developing nations.

Based on China’s historical record, the following conclusions on China’s veto strategy can be made: (1) China will be unlikely to use its veto unless there are very special circumstances. It has done so only six times since Beijing’s inclusion into the UN system in 1971, even though it has expressed disagreement with many more resolutions. (2) China will be unlikely to cast a deciding veto on a future resolution unless it feels that the country in question is challenging Beijing’s sovereignty on the issue of Taiwan. In this case, China will most likely use the situation to negotiate bilaterally with the country in question on the issue of Taiwan. (3) China will be unlikely to use its veto on an nonintervention issue unless an existing veto, most likely from Russia, is already established. In addition, China’s interests must also be fairly clearly at stake. Issues of highest concern are most likely: human rights precedence, current and future investments in Africa, and building solidarity with Africa and developing nations. In sum, China’s veto record reveals clear patterns and prerequisites that reflect China’s strategic objectives and how it selectively uses its veto power to achieve such goals.

Case Study: Sudan
Sudan is an important example of an issue where China has used its veto power to not only react to given situations, but to proactively shape the UN agenda through the threat of a veto in conjunction with its bilateral relationship with Sudan. The Darfur conflict has been described as guerrilla conflict, civil war, and genocide, and revolves around accusations of the Sudanese government oppressing and committing genocide against black Africans in favor of Arabs. Between 2004 and 2006, China abstained from six UN resolutions regarding Sudan, where the state-owned company China National Petroleum Corporation owns 40% of the consortium that dominates Sudan’s oil fields. In 2004, when the Security Council neared votes on a series of resolutions threatening to sanction Sudan’s oil sales,Wang Guangya, China’s ambassador to the U.N., confirmed China’s veto threats but dismissed suggestions that its oil interests played a role in the decision, instead saying that the resolutions would have eliminated the Sudan government’s incentive to cooperate. Based on the characteristics of the situation in Sudan, we can see that Sudan is a prime candidate for a potential Chinese veto based on its strategic objectives – (1) The proposed sanctions and use of force fall under China’s longstanding concerns of nonintervention; (2) China has vested interests in the country, most notably the large oil industry on which it depends for fuel; and finally (3) China sees its support and defense of Sudan as a way to build traction in its relationship with Africa and the developing world. These factors have given China’s threats of vetoes of the year a certain level of credibility, and as a result, the rest of the Security Council and world at large has learned to listen to or at least negotiate with China’s lead on Sudan-related issues.

However, China has never actually vetoed any sanctions on Sudan, despite threatening to do so on several occasions. As previously noted, China abstained on several votes, thereby expressing its disapproval but still allowing the resolutions to pass. For example, in 2006, when China chaired the Security Council, China allowed Resolution 1672 to pass, imposing sanctions on four Sudanese individuals – including government officials – accused of being involved in the Darfur atrocities. However, China’s lack of actual vetoes does not necessarily mean that the threats lack legitimacy or efficacy. On the contrary, China’s threats have successfully resulted in changed language in several resolutions. This is in line with its strategy of working behind the scenes before the voting record to convince other countries to drop or modify the severity of a resolution’s language. Resolutions 1564, 1591 and 1672 were passed with China’s abstention, but the penalties of the sanctions on Sudan were lessened due to China’s lobbying.

Sudan also serves as a useful case study in examining China’s increasing role in the international sphere. In 2007, China voted along with the Security Council in favor of Resolution 1769, which gave UN troops “all the necessary means” to protect themselves, defend civilians, and secure the safe passage of aid in the region under Chapter VII. Although China most likely would not have supported Resolution 1769 had it not received Sudanese government acquiescence, this was a decisive resolution nonetheless.

China’s changing policy on Sudan is yet another indicator that Beijing is in the midst of adjusting its stance on noninterference policy into one that is more flexible. Historically speaking, China’s policy towards nonintervention has stemmed from its fears that precedence for sanctions and other measures may be used against it in the future. Its behavior regarding such concerns have been based both on matters of principle, as in the many cases from which China abstained in its early years of UN participation, and on a practical basis, as seen on the issue of human rights in Burma, a sensitive issue for China. In the case of Sudan, China’s stance against sanctions was initially rhetorically couched in the language of nonintervention and more realistically concerned with protecting its oil supply in Sudan and relationship with Africa. However, China began to realize that it was not UN sanctions that would risk its investments in Africa, but rather the lack of sanctions leading to the deteriorating stability, growing public outrage, and increasing possibility of military intervention which would threaten its stake in the region. Thus, China began to leverage its relationship with Sudan to convince it to engage with the UN. This led to the breakthrough Resolution 1769 mentioned earlier – China played a key role in securing the Sudanese government’s acceptance of the UN peacekeeping plan. Chinese president Hu Jintao even raised the issue with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir at a summit during his visit to Sudan.

As China’s record and initiative on Sudan within the UN structure shows, a new Chinese foreign policy practice is emerging. China’s willingness to use its Security Council veto on the issue of Sudan, whether actual or merely apparent, reflectes Beijing’s continued movement from its previously passive role in the UN to a much more proactive one. In addition to its relationship with Sudan and convincing its government to engage with the UN on the Darfur issue, China is clearly making marked moves towards a proactive role in the international sphere, one that may even be arguably considered as that of a leader on issue such as Sudan.

Conclusions
Analysis of China’s behavior in the Security Council over the past 40 years has shown an increasingly active and flexible UN policy in Beijing, especially on peacekeeping operations and voting pattern in the security council. This can be seen as part of China’s current efforts to present itself as a “responsible power” in the international community. There is no better place for China to pursue legitimacy, improve image, and develop political standing in the international sphere than the UN. China’s increasingly active role in international efforts such as UN peacekeeping has been a conscious effort by Beijing to present itself as a partner and leader in the UN and the international community at large.

The transition from passive observer to active participant in the UN can also be seen as part of China’s wider multinational diplomacy strategy. The foundations of China’s modern international diplomacy strategy comes from Deng Xiaoping’s idea of ensuring world peace to ensure domestic development. Throughout the mid-1990’s, China developed the “new security concept,” which saw security as something to be increased through diplomacy and economic interaction, not competition as in the Cold War. This merged with the “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” concepts often used by Chinese leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao to describe China’s goals of becoming a partner, not threat, to the international community. The application of this foreign diplomacy and engagement strategy to its UN policy has led to China developing a more engaged role in the Security Council.

China’s status as an emerging power and aspirations for becoming a great power have shifted Beijing’s approach to its UN policy over the years. Realizing that it needed to begin acting in a way expected of a “responsible power,” Beijing has begun a period of unprecedented international activism in the UN. As we saw in the Sudan case study, Africa has been one such key ground, and China’s relations with other pariah countries may be of use to both the UN, which needs a way to dialogue with difficult regimes, and also to China, who seeks to prove itself in the international community.

China has shown that it is willing to adapt its previous attitude towards nonintervention issues and use its diplomatic relations with problematic regimes to convince them to be more cooperative with the UN. China’s changing economic and political interests have partly driven this shift, with increased investment in developing countries and increasing hopes for others to see it as a partner and not a threat. Looking forward, we can expect China to continue to increase its presence in the Security Council and its role in the international community.

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