The War in the West

The War in the West: China's Xinjiang Mistake

By Jennifer Yam

China is unquestionably home to political turmoil, despite the Politburo’s best efforts to quell dissent or quests for independence. It is also undeniable that one of the most popular causes is “Free Tibet”, one that overshadows another conflict that seethes beneath the surface. The March 1st knife attacks in Kunming represented the Xinjiang conflict’s tragic burst into the headlines. For decades, the ethnic struggle between the Muslim Uyghurs of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in northwest China and the Han Chinese has often played second fiddle to Tibet’s fight for independence, but not anymore. The escalation in violence between these two groups calls for serious reflection on what impacts the conflict will have if left unchecked.

Xinjiang has had a long history of political upheaval. After the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the first East Turkestan Republic was established and controlled the region until 1934. A decade later, a Soviet-backed rebellion swept across northern Xinjiang, establishing the second East Turkestan Republic, which was then absorbed by the Mao Zedong’s Communist Party shortly after his victory over Chiang Kai-Shek. Since the establishment of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in 1955 the Uyghurs have been grappling with Han Chinese influence, always having a Uyghur Chairman but ruled over by the Han CCP. They are share more ethnic and cultural similarities to the Central Asian countries that they border such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, than to the Han who exercise so much power over them.

The contention between the groups began to manifest in violent ways in the early 1990’s, after the Cultural Revolution had suppressed the majority of uprisings. One such rebellion, the 1990 Baren incident, resulted in at least 50 deaths of Uyghur rebels who had organized several attacks on government buildings. The true number of casualties is unknown, though some claim that it was in the hundreds. There were roughly 61 bombings and assassinations in Xinjiang from 1990 to 1999. There were few accounts of organized violence from the region for the next ten years, a period punctuated by sporadic bombings and protests. The next major rebellion was a mass riot in Urumpqi, the capital of Xinjiang, where hundreds of Uyghurs protested the death of two Uyghur workers in Southern China. Many Uyghurs attacked civilians, specifically targeting the Han Chinese. Described as the bloodiest event since the Tiananmen Square massacre, the dormant threat of the Uyghur-Han conflict awoke, awash in blood and chaos.

Han Chinese interest in Xinjiang has also come because of its vast energy resources. Exploration of Xinjiang’s oil and natural gas began in 1954, and with China’s growing thirst for energy, it has been the subject of increasing interest by the Politburo. Tensions between the Han and the Uyghurs are further exacerbated by the CCP’s invasive searches for natural resources. Not only would the resources extracted be used for the benefit of Eastern China, but any economic benefit that Xinjiang could have gained would also be collected by the CCP. They claim that any revenue from resources in the region would be in turn invested back into the economic development of Xinjiang, though this top-down approach has yet to yield significant benefits. Xinjiang’s geographical proximity to Central Asia also makes it a key link between China and its energy-rich neighbors. Though many countries have criticized China for its tendencies for ruthlessness when cracking down on separatists, they have also sided with the CCP for its no-tolerance stance on any terrorist activity. In the wake of 9/11, the US has moved from an attitude of support for autonomy for the Uyghur separatists to a more accusatory stance, accusing a small number of factions of being affiliated with al-Qaeda. The president of Kazakhstan has similarly expressed support for China’s position with the Uyghurs, condemning any violence the separatists may cause.

The Kunming knife attacks have sparked heated responses from the Chinese government, who vow to tame the separatists and ensure peace. The Turkestan Islamic Party, on the other hand, has condoned the violence carried out by Uyghur separatists. Leader Abdullah Mansour has expressed his approval of bloody rebellion, citing support for suicide tactics. This has given China further cause to label the Uyghurs as a terrorist group. As the CCP strives to maintain full control of all political activities within its borders, the Xinjiang conflict will prove to be a deadly challenge, with more outbursts of violence if not addressed diplomatically. The CCP views the Uyghurs as a force to be tamped down repeatedly, because there is no continuous, sustained rebellion. They seem to forget that each attack grows more dangerous and frantic in its violence, and barrel onwards with their Hammurabi code of ethics.

The Uyghurs may never achieve full independence from the Han. There are political forces other than those in China that would call for China’s strict control of Xinjiang to avoid any possibility of a terrorist activity, and it would be too difficult and very unrealistic to achieve full freedom from the Han. However, there are diplomatic solutions that involve granting them full control of their territory, perhaps most notably their natural resources. This would expel any unwarranted intrusions by the CCP to drain Xinjiang of its natural resources, allowing the Uyghurs political and economic dignity. In comparison to the massive Arab Spring uprisings, the Xinjiang Conflict may seem trivial. In time, and with no cooperation on the part of the Politburo, the sporadic outbursts of violence will escalate into a full-fledged ethnic war.

Jennifer Yam is a senior at Duke University.